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ABSTRACT
The American historiography of the Vietnam War has tended to focus on the
actions of the United States Armed Forces, the People’s Army of Vietnam, and the Viet
Cong, while the history of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) has remained
largely untold. ARVN, when mentioned, is usually portrayed as incompetent, ineffective,
and even cowardly. Recently, historians like Andrew Wiest and Mark Moyar have
challenged this view of ARVN that was originally advanced by journalists Neil Sheehan
and David Halberstam. Moyar even suggested that ARVN was winning the war until the
assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. However, there has been
no in-depth examination of ARVN military performance during this period to prove
Moyar’s point.
This study seeks to evaluate the success of ARVN combat operations against the
Viet Cong and to highlight its central role in the Vietnam War using the records of the
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, the Neil Sheehan Papers, and memoirs and
articles from South Vietnamese soldiers. Despite some Viet Cong victories, such as the
battle of Ap Bac, ARVN won numerous forgotten battles that demonstrate their
battlefield dominance at that time. This thesis argues that from 1962-1963 ARVN was
successfully defeating the Viet Cong on the battlefield. At least militarily, ARVN was
making significant progress in the Vietnam War.
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
Ly Tong Ba fought in the Vietnam War for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) from the early 1950s until the war’s end in 1975. Along the way, he was
promoted to general and led South Vietnamese troops in many of the most momentous
battles of their brief history, including the battle of Ap Bac and the defense of Kontum
during the Easter Offensive of 1972. At the end of the war, he was thrown into a
communist reeducation camp and stayed there for many years before he was finally
allowed to move to the United States. There, as he contemplated the past, one thought
continued to bother him. “Even though [ARVN] won hundreds of battles, . . . not one
single ARVN unit, . . . ever received any public praise or encouragement. However, when
on one single occasion we encountered unavoidable difficulties, both our friends and our
enemies took turns slandering us.”3 Unfortunately after 55 years, Ba’s conclusion about
this common portrayal of ARVN still holds true.
ARVN’s military operations during the early period of the war from 1962 to 1963
have been largely ignored by American historians. Most American histories of the war
during its early years seek to answer one of two questions: how did America become
involved in the Vietnam War and why was it unsuccessful in its conduct of the war? They
focus on the political failures of President Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime but ignore its
military success. This thesis seeks to examine the battles fought by ARVN from 1962 to
1963 to determine if it was successfully defeating the Viet Cong on the battlefield. It will
argue that by November, 1963, ARVN was winning the vast majority of engagements

3

Ly Tong Ba, Hoi ky 25 nam khoi lua (Westminster, CA: Tu-Quynh, n.d.), 59.

1

with the Viet Cong and that – at least militarily – it was making significant progress
toward accomplishing its strategic objectives. Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung reports, “the
objectives were survival and independence. In every political situation these remained the
two most important objectives of the South.”4 As a result of ARVN’s victories over the
Viet Cong in 1962 and 1963, survival and independence for South Vietnam seemed
within reach.
This thesis examines ARVN military success at both the tactical and strategic
levels of war. Tactical success – that is victory in battle – is defined as accomplishing the
objective of a given operation. Strategic success is defined as ARVN’s ability to
implement and effectively execute its official strategy for 1963: the Comprehensive Plan
for South Vietnam. Judging ARVN’s success at both levels based on its ability to achieve
its stated goals gives us a concrete method of measuring success. Whether or not further
success could have led to victory is impossible to know. However, ARVN’s tactical and
strategic success in 1962 and 1963 suggests that South Vietnam’s ultimate defeat in 1975
was far from inevitable.
The history of the Vietnam War is widely studied in the United States of America,
but much of the historical research and popular attention has focused on the period after
1965 when U.S. forces arrived in the country. The time before U.S. intervention is
underrepresented in the field because it was primarily a Vietnamese conflict and
American historians have preferred to focus on the period of American involvement. The
historiography of the Vietnam War is divided into two main schools of thought: orthodox
and revisionist. The orthodox school argues that the Diem regime was fundamentally
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flawed, the Viet Cong were winning, and the war against the communists was doomed to
fail. The revisionist school argues that Diem’s regime was successfully winning the war
and that America’s decision to support a coup against him threw away a chance at
victory. Regardless of their various positions, all sides agree on the importance of
understanding the Diem regime, a point with which this thesis agrees. Unfortunately, this
focus on Diem and the political situation in South Vietnam igmores the military
successes of ARVN in the field leading to an incomplete understanding of the war. By
shifting the focus to ARVN’s military engagements with the Viet Cong, a more positive
view of the war in 1962-1963 emerges.
The foundational works of the orthodox view of the war in South Vietnam during
the early 1960s were primarily written by journalists. First among these is David
Halberstam’s 1965 book The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the
Kennedy Era.5 Halberstam argued that ARVN was not capable of winning the Vietnam
War. He uses the battle of Ap Bac as a typical example of the South’s performance in
combat. Despite having helicopters, artillery, and napalm ARVN was unable to defeat a
smaller, poorly-armed Viet Cong force in the village of Ap Bac. He also argued that the
leadership of Diem was discriminatory against South Vietnam’s majority Buddhist
population, causing Diem to lose the support of the South Vietnamese people to the Viet
Cong. The only chance America still had to win was to remove Diem from power.
Halberstam’s work helped create a negative view of ARVN military performance long
before the war ended that ingrained itself into the American memory of the war and went
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unchallenged for decades. His portrayal of ARVN based primarily on the 7th Infantry
Division stationed in the Mekong Delta is not representative of ARVN’s performance as
a whole, as this thesis will prove by examining ARVN units stationed around the country.
This portrayal of South Vietnam during the early stages of the Vietnam War was
furthered by Frances Fitzgerald’s Pulitzer Prize winning Fire in the Lake.6 It is the classic
account of the war in Vietnam prior to the entry of U.S. ground troops. She, like
Halberstam, contends that Diem’s authoritarian policies lost the support of the people and
once the Viet Cong gained their support, it became impossible for the South to win the
war. Fitzgerald also points out that America was naive in its handling of the war because
it did not understand the culture of the Vietnamese people and was therefore unable to
come up with effective solutions for the unique nature of the Vietnamese conflict.
Fitzgerald by focusing so heavily on the political side of the conflict, fails to recognize
the importance of the military situation in South Vietnam during the Diem regime which is essential to understanding the war at the time.
Another classic on the early war is the Pulitzer Prize winning work of Neil
Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam.7 The book is a
biography of John Paul Vann. Sheehan argues that ARVN was losing the war by looking
at the same battle as Halberstam, Ap Bac, where Vann served as an adviser to the ARVN
7th Infantry Division. Sheehan agrees with Halberstam’s characterization of the battle. He
also supports Vann’s argument that American strategy was too focused on fighting
conventional battles instead of carrying out counterinsurgency to win the hearts and
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Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (Little, Brown and Company, 1972)
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Random House, 1988).
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minds of the Vietnamese people which Vann believed was necessary to win the war.
Sheehan, by focusing on the experiences of Vann, is limited by Vann’s perspective,
leading to an incomplete understanding of the war which does not account for the
successes of ARVN units in battles in which Vann did not participate. By examining a
wider variety of ARVN forces, including the Vietnamese Marines and ARVN divisions
outside of the Mekong Delta, this thesis will show that ARVN was winning the war
against the Viet Cong.
These award-winning works established a negative view of South Vietnamese
military performance in the popular understanding of the Vietnam War. For a long time,
their conclusions were not challenged, as attention shifted to the American phase of the
war. Only in the 1990s, once government records were declassified and the history of
American involvement became oversaturated, did historians begin looking at the start of
the Vietnam War. Many of the journalist’s conclusions were questioned and some even
overturned.
Mark Moyar may be the great iconoclast of Vietnam War historiography. He
challenges every conclusion made by the orthodox school, including that the war was not
winnable. He goes so far as to assert that the war was being won when America threw
away its chance of victory by encouraging the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem in November
1963 in his aptly titled book, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-65.8 In it,
Moyar argues that ARVN was defeating the Viet Cong in 1962-63. He challenges
Halberstam and Sheehan’s portrayal of ARVN performance at the battle of Ap Bac.
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Moyar blames John Paul Vann’s poor choice of a landing zone for the defeat and asserts
that the South’s actions in the battle, like refusing to advance over an open rice paddy
under machine gun fire, were rational reactions to the circumstances. Moyar was one of
the first historians to focus on ARVN’s military performance, but he touches on it only
briefly outside of Ap Bac. This thesis will further examine ARVN’s battles against the
Viet Cong to arrive at a more complete understanding of the war in 1962-1963.
Another work that challenges many of the conclusions of the orthodox view,
without going as far as Moyar, is Edward Miller’s Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the
United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam, which is a study of the Presidency of Ngo
Dinh Diem.9 Miller completely overturns the view of Diem as an American puppet. He
argues that Diem pursued his own vision of Vietnamese nationalism that was very
different from the visions of American and North Vietnamese leaders. Miller does not
shy away from the authoritarian nature of Diem’s regime, which caused Diem to lose
American. However, unlike Moyar, Miller argues that Diem would have been unable to
win the war because he lost the support of the Vietnamese people. Miller is part of a
growing group of historians of the Vietnam War who have learned Vietnamese and focus
more on the Vietnamese perspective of the war. However, he still fails to recognize the
significance of ARVN’s military successes.
Another historian who focuses on the South Vietnamese experience of the war
and who learned Vietnamese is Philip Catton. His work Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to
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America’s War in Vietnam, falls more solidly into the orthodox school than Miller. 10
Catton argues that the Diem regime’s strategy to win the war, the Strategic Hamlet
Program, was a failure. Due to pressure for quick results from President Diem, the
Republic of Vietnam built the hamlets too quickly for the construction of proper
fortifications, causing them to be easily overrun by the Viet Cong. Like many other
orthodox historians, Catton argues that Diem lost the support of the people and therefore
could not have won the war. This focus on the strategic hamlets misses important nature
of events on the battlefield which are key to understanding the war near the end of the
Diem regime.
ARVN Colonel Ha Mai Viet wrote a revisionist history of ARVN’s Armored
branch called Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast
Asia.11 ARVN armor units were well trained and fought in many of the major battles of
the war. Viet’s book is not a memoir, unlike many of the works written by former South
Vietnamese officers, but it is one of first works to recognize the importance of ARVN in
fighting the war. Viet argues that America abandoned South Vietnam, which led to its
defeat by the North in 1975. He contends that with continued American support, ARVN
could have successfully defended the South from the North’s invasion. He also disagrees
with Halberstam and Sheehan’s depiction of ARVN military performance during the
early stages of the war by providing details about battles that ARVN won during this
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period. Viet points out that the South Vietnamese saw Ap Bac as a minor battle and felt
that the Americans had given it far greater significance than it warranted.
One work that does not neatly fit into the two schools of Vietnam War
historiography is Andrew Wiest’s Vietnam’s Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in
the ARVN.12 It is the standard history of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, influenced
by the arguments of Fitzgerald and Moyar. Wiest traces the history of ARVN through the
lives of two of its most successful soldiers: Pham Van Dinh and Tran Ngoc Hue. He
argues that ARVN was created in the image of the United States military as a largely
conventional force that relied on firepower and technology to give it the edge on the
battlefield. South Vietnam was not able to sustain this kind of military, which was far too
expensive for a country as small as South Vietnam. Furthermore, this type of military was
not suited to the hybrid war being fought in Vietnam which required greater
counterinsurgency capabilities. Wiest also argued that the leadership of ARVN was poor
for most of the war, making victory nearly impossible. Better leaders like Pham and Tran
were rising through the ranks but were not able to reach the upper echelons of command
before the South fell. Despite being one of the few books that recognizes the importance
of ARVN in telling the history of the Vietnam War, it is primarily focused on the period
after 1965, but it will enable this thesis to place ARVN’s performance in the early 1960s
within the broader context of the war.
The significance of ARVN’s military performance in the early 1960s has been
marginalized by an overwhelming focus on political aspects of the conflict at that time. A

12

Andrew Wiest, Vietnam’s Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN (New York:
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narrower look at the war effort that incorporates South Vietnamese sources would
provide a more complex understanding of the war. This thesis is part of a growing
scholarship on the history of ARVN and the wartime experiences of South Vietnam.
Previous studies of the war from 1962-1963 have failed to understand the importance of
ARVN’s military successes and to listen to the voices of South Vietnam’s soldiers both
of which are necessary to understanding the Vietnam War.
Among the primary sources that cover ARVN’s military performance in the
Vietnam War from 1962-63, the records stored in National Archives Record Group 472
are the most important.13 RG 472 contains reports on ARVN combat operations during
this period from the records of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and
which was tasked with advising ARVN in the field. The records include daily journals,
combat after action reports, and Operational Reports - Lessons Learned (ORLL). These
sources will be used to form an account of the military actions that were conducted by
ARVN and to determine how ARVN performed in combat against the Viet Cong. The
U.S. Army’s reports on the progress of the war in Vietnam were notoriously optimistic
and potentially covered up flaws in ARVN’s performance in order to portray the U.S.
advisory effort as successful to the Kennedy administration. However, the lower level
combat reports that this thesis relies on generally avoid this shortcoming because they
focused on the minutia of tactical details and were not intended to demonstrate success to
the administration, which freed them from much of the impetus for optimism. They also
suggest that the Army’s optimism was closer to reality that previously believed.

13
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Another useful collection of military records is contained in the Library of
Congress’ Neil Sheehan collection in Washington, D. C.14 It contains copies of reports
and journals made by John Paul Vann, Richard Ziegler, and other Americans during their
time as advisors to the ARVN 7th Division. Some of the reports contained in the
collection no longer exist in the records held by the National Archives. They help
construct a more accurate picture of ARVN operations in the vital Mekong Delta region
where the 7th Division was stationed. However, these papers have difficulties beyond
those encountered with other reports. Vann mislead fellow advisors and journalists about
leading combat troops in Korea and the fact that he had been charged with sexual assault.
These revelations change our understanding of Vann’s motivations and suggests that
information originating from Vann should be vigorously scrutinized.
The United States Air Force also had advisors in South Vietnam who produced
mandatory reports on combat actions. The Air Force produced Contemporary Historical
Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations (CHECO) reports on major issues of the
Vietnam War.15 They contain a brief historical summary of the period plus many
supplementary documents attached to the end of the report. These reports primarily
concern the air missions undertaken in support of ARVN ground operations, but they
usually include a brief narrative of the ground operations as well. The Air Force’s official
history of their advisory effort The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The
Advisory Years to 1965 provides greater detail on ARVN’s military operations and
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Neil Sheehan Collection, After Action Reports (Washington: Library of Congress).
Donald Martin, Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report #61 - Part V - Air Operations - October
1961 to December 1963 (Washington: Air Force, 1964).
15

10

highlights the importance of air power to the war effort.16 These Air Force records offer a
valuable contrast to the Army perspective on events in Vietnam.
Unfortunately, ARVN’s own official reports were captured by the North
Vietnamese at the end of the Vietnam War and are difficult for historians to access.
However, exiled ARVN soldiers in the United States have endeavored to tell their stories
in self-published memoirs. Huynh Van Cao was one of ARVN’s highest-ranking officers
during this period, commanding the 4th Corps Tactical Zone and at one point he was
advised by Vann. In America he wrote Mot Kiep Nguoi about his experience in the war.17
It contains accounts of battles that happened under his command as well as his
interpretation of these events and their importance in the Vietnam War. Ly Tong Ba was
a company commander in 1963 but by the end of the war he rose to the rank of brigadier
general. Hoi ky 25 nam khoi lua is his memoir of the war and deals extensively with his
service at the head of a mechanized infantry company.18 He gives detailed accounts of
battles as well a look at the problems faced by Vietnamese officers who had to deal with
American advisors and press unfamiliar with the complexities of Vietnam. Another key
memoir is Nationalist in the Viet Nam Wars by Nguyen Cong Luan, who was a staff
officer in the 22nd Division during this period.19 He provides invaluable information on
the state of the war in the Central Highland provinces where he served.
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Robert Futrell, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965
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The Indochina monographs, a series of studies written by former ARVN officers
for the U.S. Army after the war, are an important source on numerous aspects of the
ARVN war effort from strategy to leadership to advisor relationships.20 They provide
especially useful information on how ARVN was organized and on its strategic
objectives throughout the war. The Vietnamese Marine Corps’ Twenty-One Years of
Warfare (1954-1975), Volume 2 is a book published privately by the Vietnamese Marine
Corps Association.21 It is a collection of highly detailed vignettes written by Vietnamese
Marine officers recounting the Marines major battles. However, South Vietnamese
sources are not without their own flaws. The Southerners dedication to their country
might cause them to paper over some of its flaws that led to its downfall, but these
sources must be used because they are the best way to get at the experiences of ARVN
officers from their own perspective, which is valuable in understanding the Vietnam War.
Getting the other side’s perspective is also essential to understanding the war.
North Vietnam’s military archives are completely closed to westerners, but the North
Vietnamese government has published many official histories, which are the best sources
on the communists available to those in the west who study the Vietnam War. The main
official history is Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of

20

Cao Van Vien, Leadership (Washington: Center of Military History, 1980); Cao Van Vien and
Dong Van Khuyen, Reflections on the Vietnam War (Washington: Center of Military History, 1980); Cao
Van Vien, Ngo Quang Truong, Dong Van Khuyen, Nguyen Duy Hinh, Tran Dinh Tho, Hoang Ngoc Lung,
and Chu Xuan Vien The U.S. Adviser (Washington: Center of Military History, 1980); Dong Van Khuyen,
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Vietnam 1954-1975.22 There is also the new multi-volume series History of the
Resistance War Against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954-1975 which goes into far
greater detail on communist operations during the war.23 The North Vietnamese divided
South Vietnam into many military regions and histories have been written on most of
them.24 However communist histories have serious flaws since they are intended as
propaganda in which failings and troubles are rarely, if ever, mentioned. When they are
mentioned, it is generally a sign that the problem must have been big enough to be
impossible to gloss over. The communists often claim to have killed more American or
South Vietnamese soldiers than were even present at any given battle. Furthermore, the
communist histories are full of propagandistic rhetoric. America is almost always referred
to as ‘imperialist’ and South Vietnam is identified as a ‘puppet’ government at every
opportunity. However, by reading past the bias and propaganda, one can find kernels of
useful information.
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At Texas Tech’s Vietnam Virtual Archives, the Nulsen Collection contains the
records of an advisor to a company of ARVN Rangers, an elite group of light infantry
who were some of the most effective ARVN units of the war. 25 It includes reports on
their operations, as well as a retrospective piece that asserts Nulsen’s view that the war
was going well. Since few accounts of ARVN Ranger operations have been included in
previous works on the period, this collection allows for a more detailed look at how the
best of South Vietnam’s soldiers fared in the fight against the Viet Cong.
At the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the James C. Thomson Personal
Papers contains valuable documents relating to the coup against President Diem and
American strategy in Vietnam. The Foreign Relations of the United States volumes on
the Kennedy Administration’s Vietnam policy are an invaluable source for understanding
America's relations with South Vietnam.26 These records allow this thesis to evaluate
whether the administration’s view of events matched the situation on the ground, and the
implications that may have had on the course of the Vietnam War.
The last major primary source is the news reports on combat published at the
time. Neil Sheehan’s reporting for the United Press Institute is vital, as is the work of
David Halberstam for the New York Times. The work of Peter Arnett and Malcom
Browne for the Associated Press are also important.27 These young reporters on

25
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assignment in South Vietnam were talented, yet inexperienced. However, several more
experienced news people did publish reports from this period. Richard Tregaskis was the
only American who landed with the Marines on Guadalcanal during World War II and
was a legendary war correspondent. He visited Vietnam during late 1962 and early 1963
and published Vietnam Diary which contains reports on numerous battles and the opinion
of a seasoned war correspondent, which will help temper the inexperienced observations
of the other reporters.28
These news reports contain ‘who, what, when, where, and why’ details about
many of the major battles that happened in South Vietnam during the early stages of the
war. As soon as reporters heard of a big fight, they tried to get out to the battlefield and
get interviews with U.S. personnel. However, these reports have problems of their own.
Sheehan and Halberstam were both heavily influenced by John Paul Vann and often
accepted his accounts uncritically, so their work needs to be looked at carefully. If Army
reports were potentially over-optimistic, many of the news reports are overly pessimistic
portraying the war effort as a failing enterprise. As such, the news reports serve as good
contrasts with the U.S. Army reports to try to accurately triangulate the outcome of
battles.
Each primary source has problems, flaws, and biases that makes relying on any
one of them problematic. However, by cross-referencing these sources against each other,
this thesis can overcome these limitations. Potentially inaccurate information can be
checked against other sources to produce a more reliable account of an operation. Biased
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accounts can be checked against accounts that are not affected by the same biases in
order to discern their accuracy. These documents together allow for the first complete
reconstruction of the military situation in Vietnam from 1962 to 1963. Only by
understanding the military performance of ARVN at this time can we come to a
comprehensive understanding of the Vietnam War.
There is a need for this thesis because of a void in the historiography and sources
exist to support an argument to fill this void. This thesis is organized to demonstrate the
extent of ARVN military effectiveness from 1962-1963. Chapter 2 challenges the works
of Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam regarding ARVN performance at the battle of Ap
Bac. They argued that ARVN’s fighting in the battle was “a miserable damn
performance, just like it always was.”29 The defeat at Ap Bac is seen as representative of
ARVN’s overall performance in combat. This chapter will argue that ARVN’s poor
performance at Ap Bac was not solely the result of errors made by ARVN. Bad luck,
unfavorable terrain, and mistakes made by their American advisors which have largely
gone unrecognized, were all major factors that contributed to ARVN’s defeat. A poor
operational plan and a lack of air support mollified the advantages that historians claim
ARVN had. This chapter relies on four main sources: the U.S. Army’s After Action
Report on Ap Bac, the U.S. Air Force’s Report, the secret communications between the
Pacific Command and MACV during the battle, and the Viet Cong’s own report on the
battle. ARVN’s operations in the year before Ap Bac demonstrate that their defeat was
not representative of their overall performance.
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Chapter 3 goes back to the time before the battle of Ap Bac to demonstrate how
ARVN first achieved battlefield success. The Viet Cong insurgency against the Republic
of Vietnam (RVN) began in 1960 and achieved limited success by 1961, threatening the
survival of the non-communist Southern government. The Kennedy Administration
decided to increase the U.S. advisory effort to help ARVN reverse the losing trend. By
1962, the advisory program began to show results, with ARVN attaining several
important victories and turning the tide of the war in the South’s favor. The introduction
of American air support, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers (APCs) gave ARVN
significant advantages in mobility and firepower and threw the Viet Cong war effort into
disarray. Most of the historiography of the Vietnam War acknowledges the success of the
South in 1962, but it is vastly understudied, likely due to the lack of easily accessed
sources. Even the National Archives contains only a few sources from the Year of the
Tiger, but the ORLLs contain a wealth of valuable information about ARVN combat
operations in 1962 and newspaper reports from the period are vital to filling in the gaps in
those sources. ARVN’s newfound success carried over into 1963 despite an early defeat
at Ap Bac and growing political tensions.
Chapter 4 picks up the story after Ap Bac and argues against Frances Fitzgerald
and David Halberstam’s portrayal of the war in 1963. They contend that the failures of
the Diem regime in the Buddhist protests showed that the regime had lost the support of
the people and it was therefore incapable of winning the war. The Diem government’s
oppression of the Buddhist majority and raids on pagoda’s convinced the Kennedy
Administration to support a coup against Diem. Meanwhile, ARVN was winning
significant military victories against the Viet Cong in insurgent strongholds like the
17

Mekong Delta and War Zone C. These victories conclusively demonstrate that Ap Bac
cannot be considered representative of ARVN’s combat performance during the period.
The Marines won a battle against a well-defended Viet Cong position in the Ca Mau
peninsula at the southern tip of Vietnam that was very similar to Ap Bac. The ARVN
Rangers conducted operations in the Viet Cong controlled War Zone C. In July, the 7th
Division defeated the very same forces who had defeated them at Ap Bac. The records of
the U.S. Army in the National Archives, the collections of the Vietnam Virtual Archive,
and the history of the Vietnamese Marine Corps contain useful reports on ARVN combat
operations in the year of the cat. This chapter proves that the military situation in
Vietnam in 1963 was going far better than America’s leaders were led to believe.
While most accounts of the November 1, 1963 coup against the regime of Ngo
Dinh Diem focus on the motivations behind the coup, this thesis ends by arguing that the
coup was a well-executed military operation that also demonstrates that ARVN was an
effective fighting force. The Kennedy Administration’s focus on the political failures of
the Diem regime and subsequent decision to remove Diem from power pushed several
overly ambitious ARVN commanders into overthrowing the government, leading a
victorious military to its own demise. As the new military government began to focus on
maintaining power, repeated purges of officers thought to be disloyal to the government
decimated ARVN’s command, leading to a succession of major defeats at the hands of
the North Vietnamese Army. South Vietnam was left on the verge of defeat and the
victories of 1962 and 1963 were lost to time. The Foreign Relations of the United States
documents demonstrate the administration’s mistaken view of the situation in Vietnam.
The Daily Journal of the MACV operations staff provides an almost minute for minute
18

account of the coup and is a key source for this chapter’s analysis of the coup. The
memoirs of South Vietnamese soldiers reveal the perspectives of the men who led,
carried out, and opposed the coup and their conflicted feelings about the operation. Their
history, the history of ARVN, needs to be rediscovered because it is fundamental to an
accurate understanding of the war in which those men fought and died. ARVN achieved
significant success on the battlefield, and, as a result, in 1962 and 1963 South Vietnam,
counter to the conventional historiography’s view was making considerable progress
toward victory in Vietnam.
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CHAPTER II – AP BAC REVISITED
The battle of Ap Bac which took place on 2 January 1963 is easily the best-known
battle of the early stages of the Vietnam War. On that fateful day, the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and their American advisors set out on a simple mission to
locate and destroy a suspected Viet Cong radio near Ap Bac.32 Typically, the Viet Cong
avoided fighting ARVN in such situations, but on this occasion, they stood their ground.
The battle quickly turned into a fiasco. During the fighting, the guerillas managed to
shoot down five American helicopters and hit fourteen out of the total fifteen that were
present. Three American advisors were killed, and ARVN’s casualties were considerably
higher.33
The American advisors were quick to blame ARVN for the stunning defeat.
Shortly after the battle ended, the senior advisor to the ARVN 7th Division, Colonel John
Paul Vann, summed up his view of ARVN’s conduct during the battle to several
reporters. He called it “a miserable damn performance.”34 In the Army’s official report
on the battle, the head advisor to the ARVN IV Corps, Colonel Daniel Porter, placed all
the blame for the defeat on ARVN.35 In national newspapers, U.S. advisors claimed
ARVN soldiers showed a “lack of aggressiveness” and that they had purposely disobeyed
direct orders. 36
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The advisors even claimed that one of the dead Americans had been killed while
“pleading with them [ARVN troops] to attack.”37 This claim is not supported by the
evidence. Two of the dead Americans were pilots who were killed when their helicopters
were shot down.38 So, the reference must have been to the third fatality, Captain Kenneth
Good, the only one who was with ARVN during the battle. However, he did not die until
after he had been evacuated from the battlefield and none of the advisors saw him get
wounded, only learning of his injuries hours after the fact.39 That the advisors became so
vitriolic in placing the blame on ARVN, to the point of making up shameful stories, is
understandable considering the stresses of war and death, and the crushing
disappointment of losing a battle.40 It is only natural to be upset and vindictive in such a
charged moment. Unfortunately, their fictitious claim went unchallenged for far too long.
Likewise, their larger conclusions about the battle have gone unchallenged for too
long. Both of the most famous published accounts of the battle of Ap Bac – David
Halberstam’s The Making of a Quagmire and Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie – are
based largely on the conclusions of Col. Vann and the other U.S. advisors. This chapter
will challenge their claim that ARVN alone was at fault for the debacle at Ap Bac. While
ARVN was indeed responsible for some of the mistakes that led to the defeat, they were
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not the only source of failure that day. The Battle of Ap Bac was also lost because of
largely unrecognized mistakes made by their American advisors, hard fighting by the
Viet Cong, bad luck, and poor terrain which made it nearly impossible for ARVN to
successfully attack the enemy.
The lack of training received by Vietnamese soldiers was the first factor that
contributed to ARVN’s failure at Ap Bac. Only three percent of ARVN’s time was spent
in training. Another thirteen percent was spent in combat with most of their remaining
and the vast majority of their resting.41 ARVN officers believed that combat experience
would make up for their lack of training. However, as Vann noted in his after action
report, combat experience cannot replace proper training. He wrote that the kind of
“immediate, correct reaction” needed in combat is not “instinctual” and that it happens
“only as the result of long and repetitive training.”42 He also pointed out that more
training was necessary if ARVN wanted to win future battles.43 As a result of these
training failures, some of the ARVN troops who fought that day did not respond with
enough skill to achieve victory. Both the Vietnamese and Americans must share the
blame for this failure in preparation. The Vietnamese Army did have a responsibility to
train itself, but the American advisors were in Vietnam specifically to train the ARVN.
Lapses in training were in part America’s responsibility.
Faulty intelligence was another contributing factor to the defeat at Ap Bac.
Between December 28, 1962 and January 1, 1963, the 7th Division received reports that
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there was a radio station located in the hamlet of Tan Thoi. The intelligence also
indicated that it was guarded by a single reinforced company.44 The intelligence about the
Viet Cong’s strength was incorrect. The Viet Cong had two companies around Ap Bac
and a significant number of guerrilla units were also there to provide assistance.45 After
the battle, Viet Cong troop strength was estimated at 350 to 400 men.46 For reference,
U.S. Army companies generally had an active strength of 164 men during the war.47 The
intelligence reports underestimated the strength of enemy forces by more than half. As a
result, the plan for Ap Bac was based on faulty intelligence.48 This caused it to be poorly
suited to conditions on the ground when the battle started.
While both Americans and Vietnamese contributed to the plan, the planning was
dominated by American Captain Richard Ziegler.49 His plan was simple. The South
Vietnamese forces would attack Tan Thoi from two sides. In the north, the 11th Regiment
7th Division would land by helicopter not far from the objective. Concurrently two task
forces, labelled ‘A’ and ‘B’ of Civil Guard troops – a District level South Vietnamese
militia – would advance on foot from the south, with support from a mechanized infantry
company made up of thirteen M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. The 1st Company, 1st
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Battalion of the 11th Regiment would be held in reserve along with the 352nd Ranger
Company.50
However, Ziegler’s plan had two major flaws. First, the attacks were not
coordinated so that the different elements would reach the objective at the same time. The
first troops of the 11th Regiment landed a 0703.51 The mechanized company did not begin
moving until 0630 and it was still several hours from the original objective when it was
diverted to rescue the downed helicopters.52 This piecemeal delivery of troops to
battlefield allowed the Viet Cong the opportunity to defeat the ARVN in detail – an
opportunity they were happy to take. The Viet Cong defenders never faced more than one
of the separate elements of the attacking force at a time. As a result, the American plan
effectively nullified ARVN’s numerical advantage against the Viet Cong.
Another flaw in the plan was that it did not create a unified command to control
the battle. The units of the 11th Regiment were under the command of 7th Division
commander Col. Dam, but the mechanized company and Civil Guard units were under
the local sector commander, Major Tho.53 At least once in the battle, this led to
conflicting orders. Task Force A received orders from Dam to attack while from Tho,
they were ordered to hold a blocking position. The Task Force Commander obeyed his
direct commander Tho instead of Dam, leading to a missed opportunity to flank the Viet
Cong.54 This is the fault of both the Vietnamese for their overcomplicated multiple,
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overlapping commands and of the Americans for making a plan that did not have a single
commander who alone gave orders for the whole operation.
The Americans were also to blame for another flaw in the plan. They gave a
major role in the fighting to the Civil Guard units, despite their own poor appraisal of
Civil Guard’s utility. Col. Vann admitted after the battle that regular ARVN units were
much better than the Civil Guard at conducting offensive operations and that Civil Guard
units should only be used for security operations.55 However, the plan chose to use them
offensively anyway. As a result, ARVN had less effective combat power at Ap Bac than
their numbers suggest on paper. These flaws in Ziegler’s plan allowed the Viet Cong to
fight a divided force of uneven quality piecemeal, giving the communists a great
advantage in the fight.
The Americans alone were responsible for may have been the key factor in
ARVN’s defeat: the lack of air support at the start of the battle. On the same day as Ap
Bac, ARVN fought another battle at Tay Ninh involving some 1,250 paratroopers.56 The
operation in Tay Ninh was so important that the ARVN Joint General Staff ordered the
Vietnamese-American Joint Operations Center (JOC), which controlled every fighter and
bomber in South Vietnam, to devote all of the air power in the country to support the
paratroopers.57 On 31 December, the Air Force air liaison officer to the 7th Division,
Major Herbert Prevost, presented a request to JOC for fighters to provide escort for the
helicopters making the landings and close air support for the troops on the ground at Ap
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Bac.58 He was informed that all JOC’s resources were being diverted to the Tay Ninh
operation and there would be no air support available. The next day Prevost asked JOC
again whether any air support would be available and was told no. JOC had the
impression that the 7th Division operation had been postponed.59
Unable to secure air support, the Americans decided to use an UH-1B and four
HU-1A Huey attack helicopters to support the landings, but their rocket attacks and
strafing runs proved ineffective against the Viet Cong fortifications.60 With the situation
rapidly deteriorating, the ARVN forces at Ap Bac were without effective air support until
an emergency request for fighter or bomber support was put in at 1005.61 This was just
fifteen minutes before the Viet Cong shot down the first helicopters.62 In response to the
request, JOC diverted old, propeller-driven AD-6 Skyraiders and B-26 Marauders to
strafe the Viet Cong, and drop their ordinance left over from Tay Ninh.63 This air support
was ineffective, often landing in the enemy’s rear and never hitting their machine gun
positions or fortifications.64 ARVN did not receive air support with enough firepower to
do any damage to the Viet Cong’s defenses until 1540, when a B-26 arrived with napalm
for the first time in the battle. Under the guidance of Prevost, the bomber managed to
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knock out one of the Viet Cong machine gun positions.65 Unfortunately, this occurred
several hours after most of the fighting in the battle had ended, far too late to be useful.
Air support was crucial to ARVN’s success in battle. It gave them an
overwhelming advantage in firepower, which often proved enough to swing the outcome
of a battle in their favor. The Air Force made up less than three percent of the total forces
in Vietnam but accounted for 38 percent of the Viet Cong killed in action. Furthermore,
the Air Force was responsible for killing 20 times more Viet Cong than the other services
on a per capita basis.66 By failing to get proper air support for the battle, the Americans
made an already difficult operation even more challenging. It allowed the Viet Cong to
match ARVN in firepower for most of the fighting, undercutting what had been a key
ARVN advantage.
The commander in charge of all the American forces in Vietnam, Admiral Harry
D. Felt, stationed at the Unites States Pacific Command Headquarters in Camp Smith,
Hawaii, placed blame for the defeat at Ap Bac squarely on the American advisors’
decision to carry out the operation without air support. He wrote in a secret cable to the
American military headquarters in Vietnam that the advisors had “ignored the
fundamentals of warfare by conducting an operation of this kind without adequately
preparing the landing area (with air support).”67 He also wrote, “[I] cannot understand
how decision could have been made to conduct an important operation when all available
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air support had been allocated to another operation.”68 Admiral Felt’s statements reveal
what high ranking American commanders believed was the cause of the debacle at Ap
Bac. The failure to procure adequate air support was a major contributor to ARVN’s
defeat that has gone unrecognized for too long.
For the Viet Cong, the period of preparation before the battle went much better,
contributing to their victory. In contrast to the Americans and Southerners, their
intelligence was impeccable because they had a traitor on the staff of the 7th Division.69
They knew that ARVN was coming and were able to prepare their defenses beforehand.
At 2200 the night before the battle the two companies from the 261st and 514th Battalions
at Ap Bac completed their defenses.70 The Viet Cong dug in at the dikes on the edges of
the hamlets that led into the rice paddies. This gave them an incredible, unobstructed
view of the enemy advance. This positioning also prevented the enemy from getting a
good view of them due to the dense foliage that covered the dikes.71 As a result, the
ARVN troops were unable to see where the enemy fire was coming from in order to fire
back.72 The Viet Cong foot soldiers dug deep foxholes that protected them from enemy
bombs and rockets, as well as from most small arms fire. They also set up their machine
guns in such a way that when the ARVN reserves landed by helicopter, they were caught
in a crossfire.73 The Viet Cong defenses literally put them in a good position to win.
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ARVN soon discovered that it was very difficult to dislodge the Viet Cong from these
fortifications.
The Viet Cong were also prepared for the helicopter attacks. They recognized the
weaknesses of enemy helicopters: low speed, big target, thin armor, complicated engine,
and delicate rotor.74 The Viet Cong realized that if a helicopter could be hit, it could be
destroyed. To hit a helicopter, they would need to lead it, that is to shoot in front of the
helicopter as it flies so that the bullet runs into the flight path of the chopper. They
estimated a general lead of 2/3 the length of the fuselage was necessary to land a hit on a
moving chopper.75 This training proved to be very effective once the battle started. Thus,
when the ARVN attack came, the Viet Cong were ready and waiting secure in their
defenses and prepared to shoot down enemy choppers. Their quality preparations proved
to be major factors in their victory and ARVN’s defeat.
At 0530 in the morning, the Viet Cong identified a reconnaissance plane
surveying the battlefield and readied themselves for the coming confrontation.76 The first
wave of troops from 2nd Battalion, 11th Regiment landed north of Ap Tan Thoi at 0703.
However, fog prevented ARVN from continuing the landings for nearly two more hours,
allowing the Viet Cong plenty of time to prepare. The rest of the ARVN battalion did not
arrive at the landing zone until 0935.77 They experienced little contact, taking only a
couple of rounds of enemy fire.78 The fog may not have been the biggest cause of
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ARVN’s defeat at Ap Bac, but it was the beginning of a string of bad luck which played a
much larger role in ARVN’s failure. While the fog was delaying the 7th Division’s
regular units from attacking the enemy, the Civil Guard got involved in a firefight with
the Viet Cong, kicking off the complex series of events that ended in disaster.
Task Force A consisted of the 174th, 842nd, and 892nd Civil Guard companies
making it equivalent in size to a battalion. Under the command of Captain Tri, the Task
Force moved toward the objective with the 842nd Company in the lead. Initially, they
moved in single file, but their advisor recognized this was a security risk and got them to
change formation. As they approached a tree line to the south of Ap Bac, Tri began to get
suspicious. So, he stopped his troops 150 meters from the woods and sent a recon force to
check it out.79 When the recon detachment got near the tree line, the Viet Cong opened
fire, decimating the militiamen.80 During the recon element’s retreat, bad luck dealt a
fatal blow to the task force. By chance the commander of the 842nd Company was killed
and Capt. Tri was injured.81 With several of their most important leaders out of the fight,
the already poorly trained Civil Guard units put up little resistance - hiding behind the
dikes for protection for the rest of the battle.82 Fearing they could be overrun, Task Force
A requested reinforcements.
At 0945, Col. Vann was instructed to determine a suitable landing site for the
reinforcements.83 He hoped to put the reserves on the other side of the woods from which
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the Viet Cong were attacking the Task Force.84 He became suspicious of another dense
line of foliage running perpendicular to the first, just east of Ap Bac. But due to the Viet
Cong’s well concealed defenses, he determined that there were no Viet Cong in the tree
line.85 Therefore, Vann unknowingly instructed the helicopters to land 300 meters from
the Viet Cong position.86 This placed them in a crossfire between two Viet Cong machine
guns, the worst possible position for a landing. After the landing zone turned out to be a
disaster, Vann tried dodge responsibility by claiming that he had wanted to land the
choppers farther away, but the helicopter pilots, who did not like him, disobeyed him,
landing too close to the trees.87 However, that is not what he told Richard Tregaskis just
four days after the battle, when Tregaskis asked why Vann looked so upset. He replied
that the brass had been asking him why he put the landing zone so close to the Viet Cong.
His answer was: “I’m delighted when I get a chance to get at the enemy.”88 Vann made
no mention of the pilots disobeying him. Vann’s aggressiveness caused him to pick a
risky landing site. As such, Vann alone was responsible for the selection of the bad
landing site which was the source of the most significant element of the defeat at Ap Bac
– the downing of five American helicopters.
The 102 men of the 1st Battalion, 11th Regiment set out for the battlefield at 1000.
Their choppers began to take fire as soon as they reached the landing zone. Despite this,
they managed to unload all but one squad. 89 The last chopper to land, piloted by Lt. Lew
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Stone took heavy fire. As Stone tried to pull out of the LZ, his engine was hit causing him
to crash. The chopper of Chief Warrant Officer Charles Nysewander landed for a pickup.
Just as Stone’s crew got on board, the door gunner was hit, and the crew chief, Specialist
Donald Braman, received a fatal wound. The passengers were forced to abandon the
chopper; Braman was left behind, and he died several hours later. Then, Warrant Officer
Carl Flippen’s chopper attempted to rescue them and got shot down as well. After that
attempt failed, one of the Huey attack helicopters attempted a rescue.90 It was hit in the
rotor and flipped crashing upside-down.91 The door gunner for the Huey, Sergeant
William Deal, was hit and died immediately.92 The Viet Cong’s preparation to fight the
helicopters proved to be a stunning success.
As the helicopters were being shot down, the soldiers on the ground were pinned
down by the Viet Cong.93 In the rice paddies, the ARVN troops were exposed to enemy
fire from all sides, trapped in a “horseshoe of fortifications.”94 Soldiers could hardly
move in the waist-deep mud of the paddies and were hit before they could even fire.95
Even when not being shot at, a man could easily fall when moving in the paddies.96 It
was nearly impossible for ARVN to carry out an attack in this terrain without suffering
heavy casualties. Furthermore, an attack from this position would lack the force
necessary to break through the enemy defenses. The advisor to the ARVN battalion tried
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to get the troops to attack, but had no luck.97 ARVN’s decision not to attack was
understandable. Because of the terrain, any attack over the paddies was practically
suicidal. Many of the soldiers were wounded and whenever one rose up to fire their
weapon, they got shot. The soldiers and the pilots hid behind the dikes in the paddies for
protection for the rest of the battle.98 ARVN’s reinforcements had been defeated. The
landing had been a disaster and American aircrews were trapped on the ground as a
result.
Col. Vann then compounded his poor choice of a landing zone with another bad
decision. At 1025, he ordered the mechanized company under the command of Captain
Ly Tong Ba to move to the downed helicopters and rescue the crews.99 Sending the
mechanized company to rescue the downed crews, who were not in immediate danger,
forced the rest of the battle into the same disadvantageous position in the rice paddies
where the reinforcements were pinned down by the Viet Cong. As a result, all further
ARVN attacks were against the strongest possible enemy position, putting them at a
major tactical disadvantage. To win the battle, they would have to complete the herculean
task of directly attacking fortified enemy positions through a machine gun crossfire over
open terrain.
When Ba received the order, his men were stopped at the Orchid Canal, which he
described as, “a terrible stream without any solid banks.”100 The canals of South Vietnam
were very difficult for his APCs to cross. Earlier in the day, before the fighting started, it
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had taken Ba’s carriers an hour to cross one canal.101 Ba believed it would take too long
to cross for him to get immediate help to the helicopter crews. He suggested that Task
Force B should be sent since they could reach the choppers quicker.102 Ba’s advisors and
Vann interpreted his unwillingness to cross the canal as cowardice and viewed the
difficulties crossing as an excuse to do nothing.103 Vann even threatened to have Ba
thrown in jail.104 However, Ba’s later conduct suggests he was no coward, and his
reasons for not crossing immediately were entirely understandable. In fact, if rescuing the
downed helicopter crews was so urgent that any delay from Ba was interpreted as
cowardice, then it seems odd that Task Force B was even not asked to make an attempt.
During the argument with Vann, Ba’s men were wading in the canal looking for a
possible site to cross.105 Despite this, American advisor Captain James Scanlon was under
the impression that they were not looking for a crossing site.106 However, this is
understandable. Advisors often had no idea what was going on during operations
according to Martin Dockery, another American advisor. They had trouble following the
Vietnamese’s orders and radio transmissions, and asking questions through a translator
took valuable time away from more important matters, so they were only able to come to
a very basic understanding of what was going on most of the time.107 Even the
American’s official report on the battle acknowledged that due to the language barrier
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they were unable to know exactly what the Vietnamese were doing.108 Not understanding
Ba’s intentions, Scanlon and Vann misjudged his actions.
Eventually, either Scanlon or another advisor, Captain Robert Mays, suggested
they use a crossing site further south that had been discovered by one of Ba’s men that
morning.109 Ba agreed to use that crossing and after an hour they were finally on their
way to the objective.110 Then they ran into two more canals. The first was easy to cross,
but the second and final canal was more difficult. 111 It was situated about 500 feet from
the choppers. Scanlon wanted to make an immediate crossing, but Ba wanted to recon the
canal first, so his vehicles did not get stuck. They followed Scanlon’s suggestion and
were forced to tow one of their carriers out of the water.112 After this delay, the men got
to work filling the canal with branches and dirt so that they could cross.113 Once again the
difficult terrain and a poor American decision slowed the ARVN advance to a crawl,
making an attack more difficult.
As soon as 1st Platoon crossed the canal, Ba ordered its commander SubLieutenant Nguyen Van Nhu to advance toward the enemy tree line and get a sense of the
situation. Nhu’s men quickly came under enemy fire.114 First, they picked up the downed
American pilots and secured them safely inside the carriers accomplishing their initial
objective.115 Then Nhu and another member of his crew, Sergeant Major Nguyen Van
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Hoa, were killed by Viet Cong fire -decimating the leadership of 1st Platoon.116 At this
point, two more carriers crossed the canal and attacked on the left flank of 1st Platoon.
They came under such heavy fire that the machine gunner of one M113 refused to stick
his head out of the vehicle to aim out of fear of being shot, causing him to shoot
randomly at the sky. The carriers unloaded the troops they had inside, who were
immediately raked by the enemy machine guns.
The dismounted troops were unable to locate the source of the enemy fire due to
the quality of the Viet Cong concealment, which left them unable to return effective
suppressing fire. Outgunned and with their commander dead, the carriers reloaded their
men and retreated to the canal, almost abandoning a wounded soldier in the paddy. The
lack of aggressiveness displayed by these men in attacking the enemy, though
understandable, hurt the company’s chance of winning the battle. But the terrain and the
Viet Cong’s strong defensive positions were, in reality, the decisive factors in breaking
their attack.
Finally, Ba and the rest of the carriers crossed, and Ba prepared to launch a
coordinated assault on the enemy position. Capt. Mays suggested they try to flank the
Viet Cong, but as the words escaped his lips Ba’s carrier hit a mound in the paddy
causing his machine gun to hit him in the head knocking him out for the next twenty
minutes. Mays convinced Ba’s troops to attack while he was unconscious, but they
advanced in small groups that were demolished by the enemy.117 Bad luck and the
difficult nature of the paddies combined to deprive the soldiers of leadership at a key
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point in the battle and poor advice from an American led the company to attack during a
disadvantageous situation. These factors contributed significantly to APC’s failure to
defeat the Viet Cong.
Another factor which contributed to ARVN’s defeat at Ap Bac was America’s
flawed armored personnel carrier doctrine and design, which the Vietnamese had
adopted. The machine guns mounted on top of the M113s were not protected by gun
shields because American doctrine at the time claimed that suppressing the enemy by fire
was enough protection from the enemy. However, Ba’s men were unable to see the
enemy through the foliage, making it impossible for them to deliver effective
suppressive. As a result, they were left unprotected.118 The gunners were exposed to
excessive amounts of enemy fire, leading to many casualties in that vital position.119 This
was exacerbated by the fact that the vehicle commander and machine gunner was often
the same person because the gunner’s position was the best place for the commander to
direct both the vehicle and the infantry they were carrying.120 In this case, American
vehicle design and tactical doctrine combined to put ARVN at a considerable
disadvantage.
As a result, Capt. Mays’ assault proved disastrous, greatly weakening the
firepower, command ability, and morale of the company. One notable example of bad
luck that contributed to the failure of the assault was the charge of the lone M113 with a
flamethrower. It advanced into range of the Viet Cong positions and prepared to burn

118

Viet, Steel and Blood, 367.
Ba, “Trận Ấp Bắc (Cựu tướng Lý Tòng Bá)”. Dong Song Cu.
120
Ba, “Trận Ấp Bắc (Cựu tướng Lý Tòng Bá)”. Dong Song Cu.; Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie,
253, 254.
119

39

them out of their woodland cover. This would have allowed their ARVN comrades to
deliver more effective fire on the Viet Cong position, possibly turning the tide of the
battle. A jet of flame shot out of the carrier’s flamethrower burning a 20 to 30 meter arc
of liquid fire into the sky and falling far short of the enemies defenses. The flamethrower
was supposed to have a range of 100 meters but apparently not enough gelatin had been
mixed with the gasoline before the battle to let it operate at maximum range.121 Once
more fate had dealt ARVN and the Americans a losing hand. A solid chance at breaking
the enemy defenses had been spoiled by bad luck.
Ba finally came around and began to prepare for his attack. Vann wanted Ba to
charge the Viet Cong defenses on top of the dike and let out the infantry, which he hoped
would throw the insurgents into a panic causing them to flee.122 However, Ba, a native of
the delta, knew the land as well as the Viet Cong.123 After many firefights with the
insurgents in the paddies, he anticipated that they would move to the edge of the villages
for greater protection and set up their fortifications on the dikes.124 He knew that behind
the dike there was a canal and if he charged over the dikes like Vann planned, his
vehicles would get stuck in the canal making them sitting ducks.125 So he planned to stop
on top of the dike and fire down the Viet Cong’s flanks to break their defenses.126
Ba’s men advanced on the enemy position, but their attack lacked the force it
needed to win due to the significant casualties suffered in the earlier attack. A few M113s
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managed to get close to the dike and began tossing grenades at the enemy machine guns
but missed.127 Despite these setbacks, the carriers’ advance had still managed to severely
weaken the Viet Cong line. But six of the guerillas began throwing grenades on top of
the carriers injuring many of Ba’s soldiers and disabling two of the APCs. The company
was forced to abandon them.128 Ba recognized that his men’s morale was gone after the
harsh Viet Cong counterattack and ordered them to fall back.129 He claimed that the
number of dead in the fight was even at eight.130 However, the Viet Cong claimed that
only three of their men were killed in the fighting.131 In this part of the battle, Ba and his
men had fought with intelligence and determination, but the courage of the Viet Cong
and the disastrous losses to leadership and firepower that resulted from the flawed APC
design led to their defeat.
After the fighting died down, the 7th Division command post became aware that
ARVN paratroopers were being sent to the battlefield.132 These troops had been ordered
to land at Ap Bac and attack the Viet Cong by the Joint General Staff, and the Chief of
Staff General Le Van Ty arrived at the command post to oversee the operation.133 The
American advisors tried to convince the Vietnamese to land the paras to the west of Ap
Bac to prevent the insurgents from escaping, but Col. Dam informed them that the paras
were landing in the east where Ba’s men and the helicopters were located. The
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Americans considered this an act of cowardice on Dam’s part because they believed he
was trying to let the Viet Cong get away, but he was simply following orders from
JGS.134 Initially, General Huynh Van Cao, the commander of IV Corps, set the drop time
at 1600, with enough daylight to make the attack.135 However, JGS later changed it to
1800 when it would be dark, hampering the attack. This caused Vann to suspect that Cao
was attempting to avoid a fight out of cowardice, but Cao replied, “they’re supposed to
be here. Saigon is late.”136 After the fact, both Vann and journalist Neil Sheehan put the
blame on Cao for the change in the time of the drop, but as Cao correctly pointed out, it
was a JGS decision.
As the 8th Airborne Battalion approached the landing zone the American advisor,
Colonel Triplett, shook his head and said, “Too late! Too late!”137 Compounding the
challenges presented by the late landing, the paras accidentally jumped out at the end of
their run and missed the drop zone, landing to the north near Ap Tan Thoi.138 One ARVN
soldier who made the jump described it as jumping “into a curtain of VC gunfire.”139 As
they descended, the Viet Cong shot them from the sky. Some even landed on Viet Cong
positions and were quickly killed.140 Only half of the battalion managed to jump because
it was too dark and the ones who did were spread over a kilometer. In the dark it was hard
for the paras to assemble for an assault, leading to small, scattered attacks that were
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easily pushed back.141 By 1950, the paratroopers had quit their assault.142 Yet another
ARVN attempt to push the Viet Cong out of Ap Bac ended in failure. Poor decisions by
the JGS on the location of the drop zone and the selection of a drop time put the paras in
a position to fail. This was compounded by the bad luck of dropping in the wrong place
and hard fighting by the Viet Cong.
A comparison of the leadership of the three sides during the battle can give us a
better sense of why ARVN failed, and the Viet Cong succeeded. 7th Division commander
Colonel Dam was back at the division command post and did not really control the battle,
leaving his men without much leadership which certainly contributed to ARVN’s
defeat.143 Instead of Dam, Col. Vann was the one flying over the battlefield giving orders.
Vann went on a tirade during the middle of the battle. Neil Sheehan describes Vann at
this time as “almost manic with anger and frustration.”144 Another reporter, Richard
Tregaskis, described Vann four days after the battle as still “roaring mad.”145 Capt. Ba
commented that “Vann was an advisory officer who was too hot-headed, overly
enthusiastic, and afraid of being held responsible for failure. His attitude was, ‘if we win,
then OK, but if we lose, I’ll blame someone else.’”146 During the argument with Ba over
the delay in crossing the canals Vann attempted to get Ba to cross the river by shaming
him and by threatening to throw him in jail.147 Vann’s outrageous conduct caused the
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Vietnamese to ignore his advice for the rest of the battle leading to less effective
leadership.
This is in stark contrast to the conduct of the Viet Cong commander, Hei Hoang.
His men considered him to be a very friendly leader. One described him as such, “he was
very fair and never oppressed anyone. If a man had done something wrong, he criticized
him for it, but he didn’t do so in an arrogant manner.”148 Needless to say, Hoang was
beloved by his men. Furthermore, his easy-going command style enabled him to
successfully lead the joint command of the 261st and 514th Battalions at Ap Bac.149 Unlike
Vann, Hoang calmly guided his men to victory.
Ba too was beloved by his men. So much so that they still refer to him by his
callsign “Quoc Bao” in their letters to him.150 He clearly cared about his men. Long after
the war had ended, he fondly remembered the beautiful singing of a soldier named Nghia
and an interesting soldier called ‘Scorpion’ Sung because he enjoyed eating scorpions.151
Ba recalled holding his men as they lay dying and receiving one final smile as the soldier
breathed his last breath.152 Vann’s description of Ba as a coward is especially absurd,
since Ba was considered one of the most aggressive ARVN commanders by U.S.
advisors.153 Furthermore, Ba’s explanation for not crossing the canals immediately was
entirely reasonable, and not the result of cowardice. He also demonstrated his intelligence
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by anticipating the Viet Cong’s position in the dikes, one of the few bright, shining
moments in the battle.
After the litany of failures by the Vietnamese and Americans recounted above the
battle looks like a total disaster, but at the end ARVN managed to win a small victory
against the Viet Cong. As the Viet Cong attempted to escape, Ba’s men moved 300
meters into the woods on what their advisor Capt. Mays thought was an attempt to
bivouac for the night.154 Ba had spent the hours since the earlier fight figuring out what
he was going to do next. At night Ba ordered his men to attack the insurgents position
once again.155 At Ong Boi bridge Ba’s men got into a firefight with a squad of Viet Cong
who had stayed behind to carry out a delaying action while the rest of the insurgents
withdrew during the night. In the fighting the ARVN troops killed a guerilla who had
thrown one of the grenades that forced them to retreat earlier.156 The Viet Cong sent a
team of three men to recover their comrade’s body, but fire from Ba’s men stopped them
and the recovery team withdrew with the rest of the Viet Cong.157 Ba claimed that the
enemy had been “overrun and dispersed.”158 In reality, he had won a minor skirmish, but
it was a victory. On 2 January 1963, ARVN needed all the victories it could get.
The last moments of the battle, when the Viet Cong withdrew, are perhaps its
most confusing. The Americans wanted to use artillery to decimate the Viet Cong as they
fled.159 To do this they needed flares to light up the area. This would allow aircraft to spot
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the Viet Cong so that artillery could accurately bring its fire down on the enemy.
However, ARVN decided not to use the flares, because they were worried it might also
give the enemy a better shot at the paratroopers. As a result, ARVN agreed to fire only
four rounds of artillery per hour, far too little to crush the Viet Cong.160 The Americans of
course saw this as an act of cowardice for allowing the enemy to get away. However,
ARVN did fire star shells which also illuminate the battlefield.161 The use of the star
shells makes no sense. If ARVN did not want to fire the flares to protect the paras or to
avoid killing the Viet Cong, then why fire the star shells? Since ARVN fired the star
shells, why did they not use enough firepower to destroy the enemy? Why didn’t the
Americans just use their aircraft while the star shells were up to wipe out the Viet Cong?
None of these questions has a satisfying answer. Whether due to mistakes either by the
Americans or Vietnamese or both, the artillery fire failed to stop the Viet Cong’s
withdrawal.
There are many well-known acronyms that came out of the United States military
experience in Vietnam. One of the most famous is FUBAR, which means: fouled up
beyond all recognition. Ap Bac was the FUBAR battle. Failures by the Americans and
Vietnamese, tough fighting by the Viet Cong, bad luck, and poor terrain all worked
together to produce a South Vietnamese defeat. To many, Ap Bac was interpreted as a
sign that ARVN was losing the fight against the Viet Cong.162 It has continuously been
treated as representative of ARVN’s military performance throughout the early years of
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the Vietnam War. In many histories about the war, it is the only battle during this period
that they mention.163
However, an examination of ARVN’s military performance in 1962 and the rest
of 1963 reveals that Ap Bac was not representative of ARVN’s conduct in the war as is
normally presumed. The numerous twists and turns in the course of the war are
overlooked as a result of the singular focus on Ap Bac. All of ARVN’s impressive
victories are entirely forgotten. The broader strategic implications of the larger military
situation are ignored in favor of portraying one tactical defeat as the be all end all of the
war during this period. When the battle is placed into its proper historical context, the
Diem regime’s view of Ap Bac as a “bump on the road to victory” feels like a more
appropriate judgement of the importance of the battle.164
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CHAPTER III - THE YEAR OF THE TIGER: 1962
Since 1954, an unsteady peace had settled over the Republic of Vietnam as it
increased its control over the countryside and prepared its military for the coming war.
Communist hold-overs in the South with the aid and direction of the North Vietnamese
government prepared popular support for a guerilla struggle to overthrow the government
of President Ngo Dinh Diem. The peace fell apart in 1959 when the communist guerillas
began a terrorist campaign to break government control over the countryside. They blew
up schools, bridges, and government offices and even staged prison breaks.165 The
guerillas were also able to intimidate local schools into teaching communist propaganda
instead of the government curriculum, highlighting their increasing control of the
countryside. In July, they demonstrated that they were becoming more aggressive by
attacking an American compound in Bien Hoa.166
In early January 1960, the guerillas launched two attacks that demonstrated their
increasing ability to challenge the government. In Kien Hoa, they staged an armed
uprising that overran the government militia and seized control of several villages
temporarily.167 Towards the end of the month, they attacked an ARVN military base in
Trang Sup, Tay Ninh Province and managed to seize a large number of weapons.168 The
war for Vietnam had begun and the communists held the initiative. The war for Vietnam
was to be a bloody civil war in which brother fought brother and neighbor fought
neighbor.
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Later in the year, a battalion-sized guerilla force overran several ARVN outposts
in the mountains north of Kontum. ARVN responded by sending three battalions to hunt
the insurgents, including one elite Airborne unit. They managed to kill more than one
hundred enemies, but nearly four hundred were allowed to escape.169 Emboldened by
their ability to successfully challenge the government, the North announced the formation
of the National Liberation Front (NLF) for South Vietnam on 20 December 1960.170 The
NLF became known as the ‘Viet Cong,’ a Vietnamese abbreviation for ‘Vietnamese
communist.’
In 1961, the Viet Cong insurgency increased in intensity and large attacks were
carried out throughout South Vietnam. In March, two Viet Cong battalions attacked an
ARVN battalion in Kien Phong and in September the insurgents captured government
outposts in Kontum and the capital of Phouc Thanh Province, where they killed the
province chief and deputy chief.171 American and Vietnamese leaders realized that the
war was going poorly and that an increased effort had to be made if the South was to
achieve victory.172 President John F. Kennedy increased aid for counterinsurgency and
militia training in Vietnam and began equipping ARVN with more modern military
equipment like helicopters. Kennedy’s most important contribution to the war effort was
the infusion of thousands of American military advisers into all levels of ARVN.173
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South Vietnamese officer Nguyen Cong Luan contends that Kennedy brought hope to the
anticommunist effort in South Vietnam.174
The positive effects of the increased American effort gradually became apparent
throughout 1962 as American men and money slowly trickled into Vietnam. In 1962, the
number of Americans stationed in Vietnam increased from 2,600 to 11,500.175 To oversee
the advisory effort and command American forces in Vietnam, President Kennedy
created the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) under the command of
General Paul Harkins on 8 February 1962.176 With its new American aid, ARVN went on
the offensive seeking to regain the initiative and to retake lost territory from the Viet
Cong.
In January 1962, ARVN began to implement this more aggressive stance but
suffered a major loss on 8 January when Lt. Col. Doung Vhun Sang the commander of
the 7th Division, was killed in an ambush along with his driver.177 Luckily, he was
replaced by Lt. Col. Huynh Van Cao who was considered one of ARVN’s most
aggressive and effective commanders.178 ARVN forces were spread thin throughout the
country. They were primarily engaged in static defensive positions that were over
exposed to enemy attack and could easily be overrun. Their American advisors
encouraged them to be more aggressive in combating the Viet Cong.179 ARVN followed
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their advice and began leaving their outposts. The Civil Guards and the Self Defense
Corps – a hamlet level South Vietnamese militia that cooperated closely with the district
level Civil Guards – were instructed to take up the static defense of villages while ARVN
challenged the Viet Cong’s ability to control the countryside.180 Towards the end of the
month ARVN units executed mopping up operations in central and southern Vietnam
killing fifty-one Viet Cong and capturing twenty-seven more.181 However, ARVN’s
newfound aggressiveness did not always produce results as demonstrated when four
battalions attempted to wipe out several hundred Viet Cong in Binh Hoa. The large force
easily alerted the guerillas who withdrew quickly. ARVN failed to inflict significant
damage on their prey killing as many civilians as they did insurgents: five.182
The following month began with a similar operation on 4 February in Hung My to
capture or kill any Viet Cong in the area. ARVN air assaulted into the area of operations
on helicopters, the sight of which caused some 130 Viet Cong to immediately abandon
their trenches and foxholes in a hasty withdrawal. ARVN managed to capture three Viet
Cong but poor coordination with available air support prevented effective strafing of the
fleeing guerillas. While the insurgents once again escaped ARVN’s grasp, the operation
is most notable for being the first time an American helicopter was shot down in
Vietnam.183 In late February, ARVN again faced the Viet Cong in Operation Jungle Jim
in the Dak Bron Valley. An ARVN infantry regiment with two Ranger platoons and a
Ranger company was ordered to kill or capture any Viet Cong in the area and secure the
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local Montagnard population. The ARVN forces swept the area from the northeast and
conducted aggressive small unit patrols. They successfully broke the Viet Cong control
over the area according to their American advisors killing sixteen, wounding thirty-one,
and capturing four.184 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recognized that ARVN
was aggressively attacking the enemy and that they were increasingly able to capture and
hold Viet Cong controlled areas. He determined America would continue to support the
South until eventual victory.185
In March 1962 ARVN offensive action exploded as they regained the initiative
and began to exert increasing pressure on the Viet Cong. On 6 March, the Commander of
the United States Pacific Command which oversaw the Vietnam War, Admiral Harry D.
Felt, told reporters that the South was on the offensive.186 On 2 March, a Task Force of
four Ranger companies and a recon company with artillery and air support were ordered
to destroy the Viet Cong in Vinh Binh in order to relieve pressure on the local Self
Defense Corps troops and to show the population that the government could protect them.
The air assault on the village was delayed by problems with helicopters and poor
selection of landing zones caused some units to set down two thousand meters from the
objective, forcing them to make a one-and-a-half-hour march. This allowed most Viet
Cong to escape with few casualties.187
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On 5 March, ARVN finally managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Viet Cong.
Nearly five hundred insurgents attacked a Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps Outpost at
night at Bo Tuc in Tay Ninh Province in order to capture weapons. The Viet Cong put the
outpost under a hail of submachine gun and mortar fire while they used a bazooka to
penetrate the defenses. ARVN Lt. Nguyen Van Ut used his own mortar to hold off the
insurgents until the air force arrived, forcing the guerillas to withdraw. The VNAF’s jets
spotted the insurgents resting about a mile from Bo Tuc and fired on them. Paratroopers
were then sent to determine the effectiveness of the strike and counted at least fifty-six
Viet Cong killed in action.188 For the first time ARVN had successfully coordinated with
their air support to inflict high casualties on the insurgents. This became an effective
model for combat operations against the Viet Cong, ARVN would engage the enemy and
the VNAF would finish them off with air strikes. After the fight at Bo Tuc, the local
commander wanted to move the Airborne battalion that had confirmed the Air Force’s
kills and another battalion out of the area. From 9 to 11 March, the two battalions were
ordered to conduct a reconnaissance in force east to link up with two more battalions and
kill any Viet Cong they discovered along the way. The defeat at Bo Tuc had forced the
Viet Cong into hiding resulting in no contact, but it did demonstrate that the South
Vietnamese government had gained the advantage over the insurgent forces in the area.189
On the eighth, ARVN repeated the success of Bo Tuc in a heliborne operation at
Cai Nhay in An Xuyen province. An ARVN infantry battalion, a Marine battalion, a
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Ranger company, and a recon company with air and naval support conducted an air
assault into Cai Nhay with the objective of capturing or killing the two hundred Viet
Cong in the area. The South's forces landed at four landing zones in two groups from
fourteen H-21 helicopters.190 During the landing, five of the helicopters were hit and one
was disabled requiring an entire platoon to be pulled from the operation to guard it.191
The initial landing group was not large enough to encircle the entire area of operations
allowing the Viet Cong to escape.192 During the fight, ARVN soldiers took cover in a
ditch under some shade in the rice paddies and did not advance until prodded by their
adviser and then only cautiously.193 However, this was likely to avoid getting pinned
downed in the open paddies and exposed to enemy fire where they could easily suffer
heavy casualties. Effective coordination with air support salvaged the day producing at
least thirty-eight Viet Cong killed in action.194 Just a week before, these same insurgents
had killed twenty in an ambush including the province chief.195 Now, they fled at the
sight of ARVN further demonstrating that ARVN could take any Viet Cong controlled
area back for the government. However, it gives no insight into ARVN’s ability to hold
villages from the Viet Cong as available records do not report whether the village stayed
under ARVN control or was retaken by the Viet Cong.
Most importantly, the battle at Cai Nhay demonstrates the government’s ability to
contest the Mekong Delta, which has traditionally been considered the Viet Cong’s main
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base of support in South Vietnam. Earlier in the war, it was believed that the Viet Cong
controlled eighty percent of the villages in the Mekong Delta.196 However, ARVN had
begun to turn the tide. The New York Times reported that “energetic counter-guerilla
action by Government forces has produced a marked improvement in the security of five
provinces in the upper Mekong Delta of South Vietnam.”197 ARVN’s success in the
Mekong continued throughout the year. The Cai Nhay battle also illustrated the
continuing effectiveness of air support in following through ARVN victories.
In 1960 and 1961, the Viet Cong were on the offensive and controlled the
initiative in their war against the South. Just three months into 1962, the first year of
increased American involvement, the situation had changed drastically. ARVN was now
on the offensive and it controlled the initiative, allowing it to fight the Viet Cong at times
and places of ARVN’s choosing. It had demonstrated that it could effectively take and
hold Viet Cong controlled territory and that with well-coordinated air support it could
inflict significant casualties on the enemy. South Vietnam was beginning to turn the tide
of the war in their favor.
ARVN’s success with air support and in the Mekong Delta continued in a
confrontation in Vinh Binh Province and two significant operations in An Giang Province
in the middle of the month. On 14 March, one thousand five hundred ARVN troops
launched a combined air and ground attack against the Viet Cong in Vinh Binh. They
made contact with the enemy and called in air support which killed nearly two hundred
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Viet Cong.198 In this battle in the Delta, ARVN killed almost as many Viet Cong as they
had killed in the first ten days of March throughout Vietnam: 330.199 A day later, on 15
March, ARVN carried out operation La Chap in An Giang. An ARVN Ranger and recon
company was tasked with killing or capturing Viet Cong in the area. They were assisted
by a reserve consisting of another Ranger company and an infantry battalion. Their
objective was the village of Phu Hoi which was bisected by a river. Each company landed
on opposite sides of the river and attacked in a pincer movement. They marked their
position with smoke grenades, allowing air support to attack the Viet Cong without
having to worry about friendly casualties. However, the result of the battle was mixed.
Only five Viet Cong killed in action were confirmed, but seventy were captured which
was even more useful than killing the enemy since the prisoners could be used to gather
intelligence, which could be used to produce greater gains in future operations.200
The south kept up the pressure on the Viet Cong in An Giang on 17 March.
Thirteen helicopters ferried 131 ARVN soldiers in an air assault on the village of An
Phu.201 Once again ARVN made contact with the enemy and called in air support as the
Viet Cong attempted to withdraw. They did not escape in time and suffered forty-five
men killed and another sixty-five captured by the government.202 In less than a week,
ARVN had killed roughly 250 Viet Cong and taken 135 prisoners. Air support enabled
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ARVN to inflict serious punishment on the NLF wherever they went which allowed them
to contest the Viet Cong’s control of the countryside even in the Mekong Delta.
However, not all operations in this period were as successful for ARVN.
Sometimes they made little contact with the Viet Cong killing few enemies and securing
few villages. One such operation took place from 1 to 14 March in Kien Hoa and Dinh
Tuong. It was called Operation Dan Tien VIII and it was conducted by two brigade task
forces made up of six infantry battalions of regular and provincial troops with artillery
and helicopter support. They were tasked with destroying two battalions of Viet Cong in
the area. One Task Force was ordered to encircle the area of operations and block the
enemies escape with help from the artillery, while the other swept the area for Viet Cong.
ARVN failed to find the Viet Cong who withdrew from any contact and only managed to
destroy some enemy bases.203 The cause of failure in Operation Dan Tien VIII was the
size of the force conducting the operation. In An Giang, small forces were used to entice
the Viet Cong into a fight, but in Dan Tien VIII the nearly division sized ARVN force
alerted the Viet Cong to their presence. The Viet Cong wisely chose not to engage the
larger force. American advisers realized that small unit attacks were the key to getting the
Viet Cong to fight and began to push their ARVN counterparts to replicate the successful
tactics of An Giang.
On 2 April 1962, the ARVN 42nd Regiment, with a Ranger company for
reinforcements, attacked a Viet Cong stronghold in Binh Dinh Province, which the Viet
Cong considered safe from enemy attack due to its difficult hilly terrain. A portion of the
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attack force blocked the Viet Cong escape from the North while one hundred troops in
twelve helicopters air assaulted the enemy. The Viet Cong were caught flat footed and
did not immediately return fire. ARVN was aggressive and attacked immediately. The
increased mobility provided by the new helicopters enabled ARVN to surprise the Viet
Cong which contributed significantly to their success. In the fighting, they killed some
thirty enemies and suffered only one man killed in action.204 This battle demonstrates the
considerable strides ARVN was making towards improvement. For the most part, they
got into contact with the enemy and relied on air support to finish them off. Now, they
were attacking aggressively and achieving battlefield success on their own. Going
forward they continued to improve in this area.
However, at the time aggressive fighting was not yet the norm as demonstrated by
two battles on 4 April. A Viet Cong force of two hundred ambushed a security patrol at
the ARVN Ranger Training Center in Binh Duong Province. The patrol was trying to
clear a road for a convoy and used a routine patrol route. They ran into an L shaped Viet
Cong ambush trapping them in an enemy crossfire at a turn in the road. The security
platoon began to take casualties, but a BAR gunner and two soldiers on the flank took
cover and returned fire inflicting most of the enemy’s more than thirty casualties. They
likely saved their platoon. Then, two Ranger companies arrived to help allowing the
security platoon to withdraw. However, the Rangers failed to aggressively pursue the
Viet Cong as they disengaged.205
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On the same day in Kien Hao Province, a South Vietnamese force comprised
mostly of militia with a single Ranger company was tasked with clearing the island of
Long Hoa of Viet Cong. The majority of the force attacked from the north in sampans
sweeping the island, but a second attack planned for a day later by two civil guard
companies on the Southern portion of the island was prevented by low tide which made
ferrying the troops to the island impossible. The Viet Cong used this opening to escape.
The American advisors considered the operation only a partial success despite seventeen
Viet Cong killed in action because the South Vietnamese troops failed to aggressively
attack the enemy.206 ARVN troops still lacked aggressiveness, especially the militia, but
until they became more competent the advantages of air power usually gave them the
upper hand against the Viet Cong. During this period ARVN suffered no major defeats.
For them, a bad day was failing to make contact with the enemy or allowing them to get
away, which aptly demonstrates how ARVN had come to dominate the battlefield.
ARVN also experienced success on the battlefield when the Viet Cong got up the
courage to attack them. On 7 April, ARVN spies shared intelligence about an imminent
attack by 1,200 Viet Cong around An Hoa. Six hundred Viet Cong attacked one ARVN
garrison of 110 men commanded by Captain Nguyen Van Be who kept some of his
forces outside of the compound to trap the guerillas. When the Viet Cong attacked the
compound, the men outside attacked the enemy rear catching them in a crossfire. Then
ARVN lowered its 155mm cannons to fire directly into the advancing Viet Cong at point
blank range. The barrage broke up the NLF attack and they withdrew, leaving thirty-eight
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bodies behind. Simultaneously, six hundred more Viet Cong attacked a militia post near
Tra Bong which also managed to fight them off, killing seven enemies. After the battle,
an American adviser was quoted as saying, “A few more wins like this and the back of
the Viet Cong in the area will be broken.”207 In the previous years, the Viet Cong had
been able to overrun government positions, but now ARVN staunchly defended them.
ARVN was continuing to gain the upper hand in all phases of the war. Furthermore,
Captain Nguyen’s decision to flank the Viet Cong assault demonstrates the improving
leadership and tactical abilities of ARVN officers.
In late April, ARVN experienced its most important success so far. Operation
Tiger Hunt was conducted from 12 to 27 April in an area forty kilometers north of Dalat
in Vietnam’s densely jungled Central Highlands. Three ARVN infantry battalions, a
Ranger company, a recon company, and some local forces were tasked with killing or
capturing any Viet Cong in the area, the usual mission of ARVN forces. The three
infantry battalions swept the area from North to South while the rest of the troops were
used as blocking forces. The Viet Cong cleared out rather than fight, but towards the end
of the operation ARVN left some forces behind to set up ambushes – called stayback
patrols – for the returning Viet Cong. The American advisers judged these stayback
patrols as effective killing numerous guerillas. ARVN was improving its ability to take
back Viet Cong controlled territory, but it still lacked staying power. At the end of the
operation, the local population asked to be evacuated out of the Viet Cong controlled
area.208 In insurgent warfare, winning the hearts and minds of the people is considered
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key to success. The Viet Cong worked very hard to accomplish this objective. Historians
generally believe that the Viet Cong had the support of Vietnam’s rural population during
the war. Operation Tiger Hunt demonstrates that some populations under Viet Cong
control preferred the South Vietnamese government and suggests that popular support for
the Diem regime was greater than scholars and journalists have demonstrated.
Despite ARVN’s ever-increasing success in the month of April, tragedy struck on
8 April when two American advisers were killed in action and two more were captured.
These men were the first Americans killed by enemy gunfire in the Vietnam War,
although some men had died earlier in plane crashes.209 They were ambushed in the
village of An Chau in Quang Nam province while showing members of the Self Defense
Corps how to conduct a perimeter defense. They were attacked from the forest and
overran by around one hundred Viet Cong. The Americans held off the enemy for half an
hour, but were unable to get any reinforcements.210 The American war in Vietnam began
here in a small village in the Central Highlands. Before the war was finished, 58,316
more Americans joined them. When they died, ARVN was steadily gaining ground
against the Viet Cong.
From 28 April to 1 May, two companies of the ARVN 23rd Division, a recon
platoon, and four militia companies carried out Operation Raindrop in the mountainous
central highlands town of Ban Me Thuot. Their mission was to retake an important
Vietnamese village called an Agroville and kill any Viet Cong they found. An Agroville
was a fortified village made up of peasants resettled from isolated areas in order to spread
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government control to the rural countryside as part of the 1959 Agroville Program.
ARVN surrounded the village by air and assaulted the village. A firefight started in
which six guerillas were killed while the government troops took no casualties. The
Agroville was retaken but most of the Viet Cong who had occupied it escaped.211 Once
again, ARVN demonstrated their ability to retake villages taken by the Viet Cong, but
they still needed to improve their ability to prevent the Viet Cong from taking villages
back. ARVN’s ability to protect the villages was key to victory in the war.
ARVN won another important victory on 1 May in the village of Vinh Long in
the III Corps Tactical Zone in southern Vietnam. Three companies of Rangers supported
by a company of Civil Guards carried out Operation Son Ca in which they air assaulted
Viet Cong in the vicinity. ARVN suffered no casualties in the fight. They managed to kill
eight guerillas and capture twenty-five more, but American advisers argued that if they
had stayed in the area longer conducting stay-back patrols they may have won an even
greater victory.212 Still, ARVN continued to demonstrate its ability to gain the upper hand
against the insurgents.
Another battle took place on 12 May when ARVN conducted an air assault into
the Plain of Reeds region of the Mekong Delta – a vast swamp land in southern Vietnam.
They were trying to trap the 502nd Viet Cong Battalion which had executed thirty
civilians in a nearby village just the week before. In the ensuing firefight twenty guerillas
were killed in action. ARVN’s only casualty was the result of a freak accident in which
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the helicopter landing spooked a water buffalo, which proceeded to trample a trooper to
death.213 The battle was a solid victory for the South Vietnamese which continued to keep
the enemy off balance – a situation they could hopefully exploit for greater gains in
future operations.
On 23 May, American adviser Captain Richard Ziegler helped plan a 7th Division
operation against the 504th Viet Cong Battalion in the Plain of Reeds. He planned for
ARVN to attack from multiple directions with probing task forces in the hopes of
flushing out the Viet Cong. The plan worked to great effect and air strikes caught the
insurgents in the open, killing twenty-six. Twenty-four more guerillas were captured by
ARVN including the battalion commander.214 Air power continued to prove its
effectiveness against the Viet Cong. With American air support ARVN was clearly
gaining the upper hand over their foe.
Convoy escorts were an important part of ARVN’s operational duties. Convoys
were extremely vulnerable to ambushes. On 16 June, a convoy was traveling from Ben
Cat to Bien Hoa escorted by two M8 armored cars each with a 37mm main cannon and
two platoons of ARVN infantry.215 Near Bien Hoa, they ran into a Viet Cong ambush that
had been prepared earlier in the morning. A mine destroyed a civilian vehicle that was in
front of the convoy, killing eight passengers. Recoilless rifles were fired from prepared
positions knocking out both armored cars.216 Air support in the form of a B-26 Marauder
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and two AD-6 Skyraiders took off after three hours but managed to catch the fleeing Viet
Cong killing fifty and allowing the government troops to recover stolen weapons.217
ARVN suffered five men killed in action and eight wounded. Two American advisers
died in the fighting.218 Once again air power demonstrated its ability to salvage ARVN
failures. The Air Force was continually proving it was the difference in the war giving the
South Vietnamese the upper hand against the Viet Cong.
After the battle, the ARVN Joint General Staff required air support for all
convoys in order to counter the ambushes. This new policy quickly proved effective. For
the first seven months of the year, there had only been thirty-two requests for convoy air
support. From August to October, there were 506 and a MACV report from 29 November
stated, “no convoy with air cover had been ambushed.”219 This improvement in convoy
escort capabilities further demonstrates ARVN’s growing success on the battlefield. With
the help of American air support, they were able to improve in most aspects of military
operations.
However, when the new policies were not followed, it could result in failure, as
an ambush against a convoy on 14 July demonstrates. Two companies of the 3rd Airborne
Battalion were escorting a fourteen-vehicle convoy. A Viet Cong battalion set off four
mines as the third and fourth vehicles of the convoy passed. They charged the damaged
vehicles in the hopes of capturing weapons, while taking the rest of the convoy under
fire. The ARVN troops in the front vehicles aggressively counterattacked against the
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guerilla’s flank forcing them to withdraw. The fight lasted ten minutes. The paratroopers
suffered twenty-three men killed in action and were unable to confirm any enemy
casualties though they did follow blood trails for a while suggesting they at least
seriously injured several Viet Cong.220 The convoy broke protocol by moving without air
support and paid the price for it. However, the elite paratroopers fought aggressively and
mitigated the damage proving that ARVN’s combat abilities were continuously
increasing, even in a situation as chaotic as an ambush.
On 20 July, ARVN won its most impressive victory of the year so far. The 7th
Division entered the Plain of Reeds hoping to destroy the 504th Viet Cong Battalion. Two
infantry companies – one armed with the experimental AR-15 assault rifle – conducted
five landings in order to flush out the insurgents. The first three landings turned up no
results. The fourth landing was conducted at a village near the Cambodian border. As
ARVN approached the village, they came under fire by around 150 Viet Cong in
prepared defensive positions. During the firefight, the guerillas panicked and ran. Shortly
after, the Air Force spotted the Viet Cong crossing the open paddy nearby. South
Vietnamese aircraft strafed the enemy – some fleeing in sampans – with machine gun,
cannon, and rocket fire. They even dropped a canister of napalm which killed an entire
group of Viet Cong. The ARVN troops on the ground also brought fire on the exposed
insurgents. The division’s reserves were called in to cut off the Viet Cong’s withdrawal,
but they were prevented from carrying out their orders by the 10th regiment – the troops
who had established contact with the enemy – because they did not want to share the
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victory. This infuriated the 7th Division’s adviser Colonel John Paul Vann who believed
they had allowed the Viet Cong to escape. The government claimed it killed 131 guerillas
in the battle, but Vann contended that the enemy killed in action did not exceed ninety.221
Communist records indicate the Vann’s judgement of the battle is incorrect. An
intercepted Viet Cong radio broadcast that took place shortly after the battle indicates that
they were even more infuriated by its outcome than Vann. The broadcast chastised the
guerilla commanders for allowing such a significant defeat. The insurgents also admitted
more than one hundred killed in action – closer to ARVN’s estimation of the battle than
that of Col. Vann.222 A recently published Viet Cong official history revealed that they
suffered 141 men killed in the battle – exceeding ARVN’s claim.223 Hindsight reveals
that ARVN scored a major victory in a Viet Cong stronghold. This was largely the result
of good intelligence. Local peasants had notified the government of the guerillas’
location which they used to great effect.224 Actionable intelligence is a key indicator of
the support of the population in a counterinsurgency campaign suggesting that ARVN
was not just winning battles, but also extending government control over the countryside.
Furthermore, ARVN’s increased mobility and firepower as a result of American air
support proved decisive in the battle. American aid continued to prove that it had turned
the tide of the war in the South’s favor. One of the North’s official histories recognized
this fact writing, “our people’s war forces were unable to stop the enemy’s helicopter-
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borne and armored personnel carrier assaults, and so [we] became confused and hesitant,
and our losses increased … many units were forced to disperse.”225
In late August ARVN carried out a major four phase operation in the Mekong
Delta. Operation Binh Tay took place from 15 to 30 August and involved five infantry
battalions, two Airborne battalions, a Marine battalion, two Ranger companies, and a
company of M113 APCs. Their objective was to destroy any Viet Cong in the area of
operations by carrying out numerous small targets of opportunity attacks against the
enemy. Good intelligence was necessary for the operation to be successful. For the first
several days of the operation, the Rangers dressed in civilian clothes turning the Viet
Cong’s tactic of blending in with the population against them. The Rangers managed to
successfully kill or capture several unsuspecting guerillas this way.226 At one point in the
battle the Air Force caught 125 Viet Cong in the open and killed them in a strafing
attack.227 The operation was considered a major success. The South Vietnamese killed
497 Viet Cong and captured 433 eliminating two Viet Cong battalions.228 Their own
casualties were light with only thirteen men killed in action and twenty-eight wounded.229
Air power was essential to the ARVN victory, accounting for most of the damage dealt to
the enemy, but intelligent use of deception by the Rangers played an important role as
well.
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American air support did not always guarantee victory. Coordinating air support
with ground operations was difficult and poor communications could lead to inaccurate
and therefore ineffective strikes. Operation Lam Son II in I Corps on 30 August
demonstrates this fact. The operation was an air assault against the 90th Viet Cong
Battalion by two hundred Rangers of the 10th Special Battalion and two hundred
Vietnamese Special Forces.230 The Air Force carried out an air strike to cover ARVN’s
landing at 0700, but fog delayed the helicopters landing for two hours eliminating the
element of surprise and allowing the Viet Cong to deliver heavy fire onto the landing
zones with a .30 caliber machine gun.231 In the landing, one helicopter was hit and
abandoned which forced the Air Force to destroy it to prevent it falling into enemy
hands.232 Once the Rangers landed, they quickly took their objective, a Viet Cong
Command Post. In the fighting, the ARVN troops killed fifty-three Viet Cong, including
their battalion commander, while suffering eleven of their own killed in action.233 During
the withdrawal there was more confusion because the withdrawal plan was changed
without notice. As a result, another helicopter was shot down and needed to be
destroyed.234 The air force found no good targets, but the skill of South Vietnam's elite
Rangers and Special Forces made the difference and scored a significant victory.235 At
this point in the war, effective airpower was still the key to victory, but ARVN was
showing clear signs of improvement. The Rangers were clearly capable of operating
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independently against the Viet Cong and Operation Lam Son II demonstrates ARVN’s
growing ability to win battles through aggressive offensive action.
From August to September, ARVN’s 7th Division carried out six straight
operations against the Viet Cong in which they killed more than one hundred enemies.236
The most impressive of these victories came on 18 September near the village of An Hu
in the Plain of Reeds, a Viet Cong stronghold.237 Colonel Cao’s men once again hunted
the 502nd Viet Cong Battalion. The attacking force was spearheaded by a company of
M113 armored personnel carriers led by Captain Ly Tong Ba. Captain Ba described this
period as such, “on our side it was always ‘Attack! Attack!’”238 Attack is exactly what he
did. As Ba’s APCs advanced through the paddies, the Viet Cong decided to put up a
fight. The guerillas quickly realized their gun fire was ineffective against the armor of the
carriers. Ba’s men made good use of their carrier’s .50 caliber machine guns shooting any
insurgents who tried to flee. Some attempted to hide in the water of the paddies, but the
wake caused by the carriers revealed them to Ba’s men. When the drivers spotted a
guerilla, they charged the enemy crushing some Viet Cong under their tracks. It was the
biggest victory for ARVN so far, with 158 Viet Cong killed in action and sixty more
captured.239 Ba claimed that his men won because the enemy did not anticipate the
strength of their armor.240 It could equally be claimed that ARVN won because the Viet
Cong did not anticipate their firepower.
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This operation shows most clearly the positive affect the American advisory effort
had on the South’s war effort. American made M113s were the difference in this fight
and American support had become the difference in the war. Since America’s increased
aid to South Vietnam in the start of the year, ARVN had reversed the situation in
Vietnam. ARVN was besting the Viet Cong on the field of battle. They were keeping the
Viet Cong off balance and controlling the initiative, which enabled the government to
maintain and spread its authority over the country which is what ARVN needed to do in
order to win the war.
On 5 October, the 7th Division found itself in an unfamiliar position. It suffered
ARVN’s most serious defeat of the year so far. A company of Rangers air assaulted into
the Plain of Reeds hunting the 514th Viet Cong Battalion. As the Rangers crossed an open
paddy, they came under fire from Viet Cong arrayed along a dike. They had no cover, but
some of the Rangers still attempted to flank the Viet Cong. Caught in the open the
Rangers were quickly slaughtered suffering twenty men killed in action and forty
wounded. Reinforcements arrived forcing the guerillas to withdraw. As the Viet Cong
withdrew ARVN suffered four more casualties.241 It was a significant defeat for ARVN,
some of their best soldiers had been killed. Poor terrain was the decisive factor in
ARVN’s defeat giving them little cover from enemy fire.
The 7th Division adviser Col. John Paul Vann claimed that ARVN suffered a far
more significant setback after the battle. He alleged that President Diem ordered the
Division commander Col. Huynh Van Cao to avoid further casualties in order to avoid a
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coup. Vann asserts that this led Cao to carry out pointless operations and cut the
Americans out of operational planning.242 The evidence does not support Vann’s claim of
a halt in operations. Moyar points out that in the weeks after the battle, ARVN casualties
actually increased and that the American embassy explained these casualties as a result of
the “increasing aggressiveness of [government] units in small actions.”243 Furthermore,
contemporary sources reveal that the 7th Division was still out conducting operations
against the Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta. On 14 November, reporter Richard Tregaskis
met Col. Vann at the 7th Division headquarters. Vann explained the plan of an ongoing
operation in detail suggesting that the Vietnamese had not cut the Americans out of the
planning. The government troops were attempting to encircle a group of suspected Viet
Cong by air. During the operation, Tregaskis observed several firefights from a helicopter
and spotted two groups of black clad Viet Cong prisoners haphazardly carrying a
wounded comrade.244 At the time, Vann reported that nine guerillas were killed in the
fighting and fifteen taken prisoner.245 Although this does not approach the numbers put
up in some 7th Division operations it clearly supports the conclusion that ARVN was still
aggressively engaging the Viet Cong.
From 11 to 19 October, ARVN carried out Operation Morning Star hunting
insurgents in Tay Ninh Province on the border with Cambodia – a Viet Cong
stronghold.246 Five thousand troops of the 5th and 7th Divisions turned up few results on
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the first day but on the second day a group of guerillas were spotted in a sampan. An air
strike was called on them killing thirty-seven insurgents. Four ARVN troopers were
killed in an ambush on the same day.247 For most of the rest of the operation there was
little action as the Viet Cong eluded ARVN by hiding in tunnels and caves. However, as
ARVN conducted its withdrawal the Viet Cong decided to counterattack. For the first
time in the Vietnam War, the Huey helicopter was called into action killing twenty-five
of the insurgents with its machine gun.248 ARVN once again used the advantage of
American air power to incredible success. They managed to win an important victory in a
key Viet Cong area and stayed on the offensive keeping their enemy off balance.
In a counterinsurgency, it is impossible to win massive victories in every battle
but gaining the advantage in the slow grind of guerilla warfare is essential to victory.
ARVN demonstrated this ability in an operation that began on 15 October in I Corps. The
18th Ranger Battalion conducted a sweep operation against Viet Cong in the area. Most of
the guerillas ran at the sight of the Ranger’s helicopters approaching but a few fired on
them from a nearby hill. The Rangers returned and killed two insurgents. Air strikes
pounded the hill, but the Viet Cong pulled out. The ranges advanced carefully on a
nearby village to avoid booby traps. More Rangers landed nearby where they killed
another guerilla in a firefight. The two companies met up and stayed in the area for a few
days to little effect. On the third day of the operation, they attempted to capture a guerilla,
but he ran away after a fist fight forcing them to shoot him.249
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On 25 November, two battalions of Viet Cong attacked Phuoc Chia Outpost
which was defended by one hundred ARVN soldiers. Nearly one thousand guerrillas
charged the outpost early in the morning, but the approaches to the outpost were already
ranged and numbered. As such the advancing guerillas were decimated by devastating
artillery fire. The insurgents had set off a trip flare when the attack began, bringing the
ARVN defenders into action. As the Viet Cong approached the barbed wire perimeter,
they also came under intense machine gun and small arms fire which halted their
advance. One ARVN soldier manning a machine gun killed forty guerillas who were
charging his position. At this point, ARVN counterattacked, drove back the Viet Cong,
and forced them to retreat after a bloody three-hour battle. Both insurgent battalion
commanders were killed along with 122 other Viet Cong. ARVN suffered only ten
wounded. They had been warned about the attack by friendly locals and receiving good
intelligence from the population is key to any successful counterinsurgency campaign.250
This battle demonstrates that ARVN was making important gains in that direction. The
American advisers praised ARVN’s performance saying that the battle was, “entirely a
Vietnamese victory. The Vietnamese fought as they had been trained to fight and they
won not because they had helicopters or fighter planes, but because they were well
prepared and fought well.”251 ARVN had been outnumbered at the start of the battle and
won one of their most decisive victories to date. The battle for Phuoc Chia Outpost
demonstrates ARVN’s increasing ability to win victories independent of American air
support especially when on the defensive.
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ARVN finished the year with a push into the previously uncontested Viet Cong
stronghold known as War Zone D near Saigon. The push began on 20 November when
five hundred Rangers parachuted into the guerilla base.252 This first phase called
Operation Boondodge was a planned three-week campaign that was halted after only two.
Boondodge achieved mediocre results killing on three insurgents as they avoided
detection by hiding in tunnels and caves.253 Despite this setback, ARVN continued the
offensive with an intense bombing campaign. One airstrike killed at least ten Viet Cong
judging by the number of fresh graves ARVN found. In the last three weeks of the year,
ARVN killed sixty-two Viet Cong in War Zone D and managed to capture ten
guerillas.254 It was another impressive victory in an area of enemy strength. ARVN
finished the year by putting pressure onto the enemy and forcing them on the defensive.
Clearly 1962, was a momentous year for ARVN. In 1961, they were on the
defensive and feared being completely overrun. The increase in American aid had turned
the tide of the war, as access to helicopters, attack aircraft, and armored personnel
carriers gave ARVN troops increased firepower and mobility. Throughout the year, these
troops took full advantage of their new capabilities. ARVN took the initiative from the
Viet Cong and went on the offensive. They struck at key guerilla strongholds and worked
to secure and maintain government control in the countryside. Most importantly they
succeeded in every armed forces’ central mission – to defeat their nation’s enemies in
combat. Throughout the year of the tiger ARVN demonstrated its ability to defeat the
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Viet Cong on the field of battle. However, the Viet Cong were not going to give up
without a fight. Would 1963 be a year of Ap Bacs or would ARVN be able to continue its
success on the battlefield?

75

CHAPTER IV – THE YEAR OF THE CAT: 1963
1962 was a year of stunning success for ARVN. Throughout South Vietnam,
ARVN won impressive victories against the Viet Cong, and with American air support,
they reversed the losing trend of previous years. However, the Vietnam War was far from
finished, and in 1963, the intensity of the fighting increased significantly. The year began
with the Battle of Ap Bac in which ARVN was dealt a heavy blow. For many historians –
like John Nagl, Gregory Daddis, and David Palmer – ARVN’s performance at Ap Bac
was seen as representative of their performance throughout the early period of the war. 255
However, they are overlooking ARVN’s many successes. These successes include the
months long ARVN Ranger campaign into the communist stronghold of War Zone D, the
7th Infantry Division’s July victory against the guerilla forces that had mauled it at Ap
Bac, and the Vietnamese Marines stunning September Victory at Dam Doi. The latter
two battles closely resembled Ap Bac with ARVN troops assaulting dug-in Viet Cong
defenders over open rice paddies, except in these two cases ARVN won conclusively. In
1963, despite some setbacks, ARVN continued to aggressively fight the enemy and won
significant victories that brought South Vietnam closer to victory.
The first few days of the new year were a hectic time in South Vietnam. In the
shadow of Ap Bac, several other important battles took place in which ARVN fought
well despite sometimes overwhelming odds. These battles reveal that even as ARVN’s 7th
Division was struggling in the rice paddies, South Vietnam’s soldiers were more than a
match for the Viet Cong. On 2 January 1963, as the fighting raged at Ap Bac, ARVN
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launched a major operation in Tay Ninh Province near the border of Cambodia that had
priority on all air support in the country.256 Their objective was the headquarters of the
National Liberation Front guarded by some one thousand guerillas, the location of which
was based on confirmed intelligence that the military received from a Viet Cong prisoner
of war.257 An hour before the operation was scheduled to begin, air support began
bombarding the insurgent headquarters. At H-hour, 1,250 paratroopers dropped onto the
battlefield while a battalion of Rangers flew in by helicopter.258 ARVN’s best troops
fanned out to demolish the enemy main base killing seventy-six insurgents while taking
only nine casualties.259 Throughout the fight, the bombing of NLF headquarters was
intense as twenty-six AD-6 Skyraiders, sixteen B-26 Marauders, and twenty-four T-28
Trojans provided “splendid” air support that estimates from prisoners claim killed
between four hundred and one thousand Viet Cong.260 The exact number does not matter
as much as the fact that ARVN dealt a devastating blow against the Viet Cong at Tay
Ninh – even greater than the blow dealt against them at Ap Bac. The battle illustrates that
American air power continued to give South Vietnam a decided edge on the battlefield
unlike at Ap Bac where a lack of air support contributed to disaster. Furthermore, ARVN
conducted a complex airborne assault, a difficult operation for any military, with great
success demonstrating that their poor performance at Ap Bac was far from representative
of the entire war during 1963.
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A day later, 3 January, the Vietnamese Navy and Marines began their “Wave of
Affection” campaign to reoccupy and pacify the Nam Can area in the Viet Cong
stronghold of the Ca Mau Peninsula, the southernmost tip of Vietnam.261 It was the
largest Navy operation of the war so far, with numerous landing craft, gunboats, and
patrol craft complemented by two battalions of Marines – the 2nd and the 4th – and a
battery of 75mm Howitzers.262 The operations were led by Navy Captain Ho Tan Quyen.
The plan called for a one-month joint Navy-Marines campaign to secure the area
followed by the construction of new bases from which to expand government control. At
0630, the Marines began landing on the shore of the Man Can river while the Navy
provided covering fire with their 76mm guns, which obliterated the enemy’s wooden
bunkers. One boat killed three Viet Cong that were spotted nearby carrying weapons.263
The 2nd Battalion of Sea Tigers, as the Marines were called, began to secure the
beachhead which prompted the guerillas to flee after firing a few shots. 2nd Battalion
chased the enemy while the howitzer battery lumbered up to provide fire support to their
comrades.264 The hunt for the fleeing guerillas went slowly in the swampy terrain, and
the Marines engaged the Viet Cong in only a few small skirmishes capturing five
prisoners.265
On 4 January, the 4th Marine Battalion landed on a beach on the eastern side of
the Peninsula that had already been secured by Navy frogmen.266 The landing was
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covered by monitors with 40mm guns. Once on the ground, the Marines employed a
pincer movement to the trap the Viet Cong. The going was slow in the difficult terrain,
but the Marines managed to kill or capture an unspecified number of guerillas.267 The
Marines and Navy worked to win the support of the population by respecting their
property and not eating a pig that they had found which might belong to a civilian, as
well as by providing medical care to the locals.268 Later in the campaign, the 1st Battalion,
which had arrived as reinforcements, killed five insurgents in a firefight after one of their
landing craft was struck by a 75mm recoilless rifle round.269 The Wave of Affection
campaign demonstrated that the Marines were capable of carrying out successful
amphibious assaults, considered the most difficult of military operations, and
aggressively pursuing the enemy through difficult terrain. The operation highlighted both
their competence and their fighting spirit which further illustrates that the failures at Ap
Bac were not indicative of the fighting abilities of the entire Vietnamese military.
On 3 January, the American Special Forces run militia training camp at Plei
Mrong was assaulted by forty Viet Cong who were let through the barbed wire defenses
by eleven insurgent sympathizer trainees.270 The infiltrators opened fire on the defenders
and tossed grenades and TNT into their tents inflicting heavy casualties. The local
Montagnard Strike Force and loyal trainees manned the trenches and defended what was
left of the compound. Four Green Berets occupied an inoperable mortar pit holding off
multiple waves of Viet Cong attackers, some armed with bangalore torpedoes. ARVN Lt.
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Bao helped call in artillery support from nearby ARVN units to knock out an enemy
recoilless rifle. At 0600, the guerillas withdrew having only partially overrun the camp.
In the end twenty-nine defenders lay dead, seventy-three were missing, and thirty-eight
were wounded.271 However, nearly fifty of the attackers had also been killed in action.272
With no air support and facing an enemy with the element of surprise that had already
gotten past their defenses, the fact that the Americans and South Vietnamese managed to
hold onto Plei Mrong seemed to be almost a miracle. In reality, it was a testament to their
determination and further proof that ARVN could out fight the Viet Cong, even in the
most challenging circumstances. In light of the Airborne’s success at Tay Ninh, the
Marines skill on the Ca Mau Peninsula, and the tenacity of the Plei Mrong defenders the
struggles of ARVN at Ap Bac look more like an aberration of ARVN combat
performance than the norm.
At the start of 1963, America and South Vietnam approved their strategy for
winning the Vietnam War – the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN). The
goal of the strategy was for South Vietnam to be strong enough to defend itself by the
end of 1965. This was to be accomplished through the Strategic Hamlet Program and the
National Campaign Plan (NCP). The Strategic Hamlet Program had begun in 1962 and
was designed to isolate the Viet Cong from the population by resettling them into
fortified, government-controlled hamlets – that is local communities occupied by
government troops, usually militia, and administered by government officials.
Government control denied the insurgents access to the intelligence, recruits, food, and
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shelter that they needed from the population in order to survive.273 By cutting off the Viet
Cong’s main source of support, ARVN believed that they could cause the insurgency to
collapse.274
The Vietnamese people, especially in the Delta, were closely tied to the land. As a
result, the resettlement aspect of the Strategic Hamlet Program caused serious public
outrage. The Diem regime understood that the public was angry with resettlement, but
they believed that it was necessary in order to secure the hamlets. Most Vietnamese
hamlets in the Delta were spread out, making organized defense difficult. Resettlement
allowed the creation of more easily defensible closely constructed hamlets which was
necessary in order to accomplish the goal of separating the Viet Cong from the
population.275 The government accepted the anger in order to quickly complete this
primary objective. Furthermore, the administration believed that over time improvements
brought about by civic and economic programs would make the population forget their
anger at resettlement and win over their support.276 Despite starting in 1962, the Strategic
Hamlet Program played only a small role in the fighting that year. Starting in 1963, the
Viet Cong launched an aggressive effort to destroy the strategic hamlets. ARVN’s
success in defending them was key to their success in the year of the cat.
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The NCP was the military complement to the Strategic Hamlet Program. It
directed ARVN to launch offensives against the Viet Cong – destroying them whenever
possible – in order to apply continuous pressure on guerilla-controlled areas and to
expand government control into new areas.277 In 1963, ARVN executed the NCP well –
taking the fight to the heart of the enemy and bringing an element of government rule to
places it had never been before. The Wave of Affection campaign was a perfect example
of the kind of operation called for by the NCP.
During the first five months of 1963, ARVN conducted a series of operations that
sought to implement the National Campaign Plan in a key Viet Cong Stronghold – War
Zone D. The ARVN Rangers established a government footprint in the area and put
constant pressure on the guerillas. It was a continuation of ARVN’s forays into War Zone
D in 1962. The campaign began on 3 January 1963 with the start of the Part Two of
Phase III of Operation Holiday which lasted until 9 January. Nine Ranger companies of
the Phouc-Binh-Thanh Special Zone (PBTSZ) led by Lt. Col. Dien air assaulted into War
Zone D in three columns on the hunt for a Viet Cong Regiment.278 The landing zone was
initially contested, but the Rangers quickly secured it. The next six days were spent on
reconnaissance missions, raids, and ambushes in thick jungle where quick movement was
impossible while the nights were filled with guerilla probes on the Ranger’s defenses.279
During Operation Holiday two main engagements with the enemy took place. In
the first, one platoon of the 30th Special Battalion led by Capt. Cang stumbled upon the
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defenses of a Viet Cong field hospital. From ten meters away, an enemy machine gun
ripped into the Rangers killing four of them including Capt. Cang. The surviving Rangers
returned fire and fell back to regroup. Several minutes later, they returned to the hospital
to retrieve their dead and wounded. A captured occupant of the hospital claimed that the
guerillas had also withdrawn as soon as the fighting started and claimed that thirty-five of
them had been killed in the fight, though this was likely an exaggeration.280 The other
main engagement happened on 4 January where some of the Rangers fought an enemy
company. The casualties were light on both sides. The Rangers suffered one dead and
seven wounded while managing to kill twelve insurgents.281
While the casualty figures of Operation Holiday were not spectacular, it had
accomplished the objectives set by the NCP. The Rangers applied continuous pressure on
the Viet Cong of War Zone D which prevented the enemy from gaining the initiative.
Every moment the guerillas spent withdrawing from contact with the Rangers or probing
their defenses were lost opportunities to disrupt the Strategic Hamlet Program. Through
their operations deep in enemy territory, ARVN turned the guerillas advantage of running
away against them. For the Viet Cong, retreat no longer represented living to fight
another day. It became a waste of time in which more and more of the population came
under government control in the strategic hamlets denying the insurgents their most
valuable resource – the population.
In February, ARVN kept the pressure up on the Viet Cong of War Zone D by
launching Operation Hardtimes I. From 2 to 16 February, the PBTSZ Rangers conducted
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what they considered the longest and most successful operation in War Zone D so far.
The Rangers went in led by a Viet Cong defector who said he would lead them to the
headquarters of Zone D. Early in the operation, the Rangers bivouacked before nightfall
alerting the Viet Cong to their location. When they moved out the next morning, they
were ambushed resulting in nine men killed and five wounded.282 The commander was
replaced by Lt. Col. Dien who took measures to avoid further ambushes, like not
stopping before nightfall and moving out before dawn, so it would be more difficult for
the guerillas to ascertain their location. Movement in the jungle was slow and the
Rangers had to use elephant paths to get through the thickest portions. On the fourth day
of the operation, the lead element spotted an insurgent outpost. Col. Dien realized that
attacking it might alert the headquarters they were hunting, but he decided, after
consulting his adviser Major Charles Nulsen, to take the target of opportunity while he
had the element of surprise.283 The Rangers began their assault at 0600 and overran the
entire outpost in fifteen minutes, but were disappointed when they counted one body.284
Realizing their opportunity to attack the enemy headquarters was fading, the
Rangers moved out for their primary objective covering four kilometers by 1000. The
lead element of the column came under enemy fire from the Viet Cong War Zone D HQ,
and the rest of the Rangers double-timed into action. The next half hour was a chaotic
maelstrom of constant fire. The Rangers pushed through the enemy base capturing two
prisoners – one wounded and one who had been looking for an opportunity to defect. The
prisoners revealed that the Rangers had found the HQ, but it had been evacuated, and
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they were part of a security platoon that stayed behind to fight a delaying action.285 The
wounded prisoner succumbed to his injuries shortly after, but the defector went on to
provide valuable intelligence on Zone D. Although the Rangers did not manage to wipe
out the guerillas at the HQ, they came away with an even more valuable prize: a complete
roster of the all the guerillas in War Zone D and a definitive list of the enemy units
stationed there.286 Their pressure on the Viet Cong in Zone D disrupted the enemy HQ’s
ability to plan operations to dismantle the government’s strategic hamlets in III Corps.
The Rangers also set themselves up with actionable intelligence they could use to inflict
greater blows against the enemy in the future.
On 24 February, the PBTSZ Rangers charged back into War Zone D for an
operation that lasted until 10 March – Hardtimes II. Two companies of Special Forces
accompanied the eleven Ranger companies on this mission, while two more companies of
Rangers and a Mechanized company stood by as reinforcements.287 The Rangers made
their initial contact with the Viet Cong on 26 February when Column C spotted two
sampans carrying the enemy down a river. The Rangers opened fire killing all eleven of
the enemy and sinking both sampans.288 The next day Column B’s defensive perimeter
was infiltrated by a lone guerilla who opened fire with a submachine gun. The guerilla
was quickly killed and only managed to wound three Rangers.289 On 28 February, eight
guerillas ambushed Column A, but they were easily dispatched and left behind a lone
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dead comrade who was killed when he was hit by a M-79 grenade launcher.290 The
Rangers suffered two wounded in the ambush.291 On 2 March, the Viet Cong wounded
six Rangers and an American adviser by tossing a grenade into a river where they were
bathing.292
Three days later, on 5 March the Rangers returned to the site of the hospital they
discovered in Operation Holiday. They found it abandoned, but they discovered a nearby
enemy camp of twenty-five buildings while searching the area. During the search, one
Ranger was wounded by a sniper.293 Their planning for the attack on the base took too
long. When they launched the assault on 7 March, an AD-6 Skyraider destroyed
seventeen of the buildings, but there were no Viet Cong to be found.294 Operation
Hardtimes II gives insight into the broader course of the war in 1963 in which most
engagements were minor and the results were meager. Despite this, ARVN still had the
upper hand suffering three dead to the Viet Cong’s thirteen dead.295 As the operation
wound down, the Rangers had a growing feeling that the Viet Cong would not continue
to put up with their infiltrations for much longer.296 The guerillas needed to turn their
attention to the hamlets, and to do that, they would need to defeat ARVN in battle.
On 25 March, ARVN won a major victory against the Viet Cong in the area. This
time, the guerillas faced two battalions of paratroopers from the Airborne Division with
armored personnel carrier support. The ARVN troops were searching for the location of a
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major Viet Cong arms factory which they had learned about from a defector. Some of the
paratroopers jumped into the area of operations while others were flown in by helicopter.
As ARVN pushed for the factory, the guerillas were taken by surprise losing a confirmed
twenty-five men killed in action. When ARVN took the arms factory, it captured thirty
tons of copper and iron ore and all the factory equipment.297 By dealing such a solid
defeat to the Viet Cong, ARVN kept the initiative and discouraged them from going on
the offensive. In light of their success, ARVN decided to ratchet up the pressure on the
Viet Cong in Zone D.
On 6 April, the PBTSZ Rangers moved into War Zone D to set up a base with an
airstrip in the heart of enemy territory in an operation called Hardtimes III. The operation
lasted for nearly two months. Lt. Col. Dien had at his disposal two battalions of Rangers
and two platoons of armor – one of M113s and one of M114s – plus a mortar platoon and
an engineer battalion to build the base and airstrip.298 The Rangers set up their base next
to a bridge over the Rang Rang River. The mortar platoon set up inside the defenses to
provide supporting fire and the Rangers spent their days patrolling the perimeter. On the
night of 11 April, they made first contact with the enemy when the 316th Ranger
Company ambushed and killed two Viet Cong.299 On 14 April, the Rangers suffered their
first casualty when a sniper wounded an engineer. Four days later, two Ranger companies
ran into a mine-initiated ambush near the airstrip, but a quick reaction by the M114s
broke the ambush. Only three Rangers were wounded. Two more Viet Cong ambushes on
the same day wounded a measly eight ARVN soldiers. On 25 April, the 316th Ranger
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Company killed another guerilla in a small skirmish.300 For the rest of the operation there
was only intermittent skirmishing interspersed with the occasional mine that wounded a
few ARVN every few days.301 The operation was far from perfect. The bases defenses
were poorly set up and vulnerable to attack and the logistics and communications
situation at the base was insufficient.302 Despite these shortcomings, ARVN scored a
major success. They determined that their months of harassment had forced the Viet
Cong to abandon War Zone D.303 The Rangers dedication to implementing the NCP in
Zone D kept pressure on the Viet Cong for five months, preventing them from mounting
attacks to dismantle strategic hamlets in the area and forcing them to abandon a key base.
In doing so, the Rangers demonstrated that the South Vietnamese were making steady
progress toward accomplishing their objective of separating the Viet Cong from their
base of support in the population.
On 26 July, ARVN decided to pull out of the base at Rang Rang. When they did,
they left behind eight hundred mines which killed several Viet Cong who tried to dig
them up. The Americans were upset that the South Vietnamese had abandoned the base
to the guerillas who preceded to blow up the bridge over the Rang Rang River and tear up
the airstrip. However, ARVN reasoned that the base would be too difficult to supply
during the rainy season.304 Furthermore, there was no point wasting the Rangers’ combat
power on an area the Viet Cong had abandoned. The NCP called for applying continuous
pressure against the enemy. Strategically, pulling out of Rang Rang was the right call.
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While the Rangers were busy disrupting the Viet Cong in War Zone D, the war
continued unabated in the rest of the country. On 28 January, ARVN launched Operation
Loi Phong, forty kilometers south of Saigon, to remove civilians from guerilla control
and resettle them in strategic hamlets.305 When the operation began, one thousand four
hundred paratroopers dropped into the area of operations while an element of Rangers
went in by truck.306 The Viet Cong were aware of the operation beforehand and tried to
flee.307 Two paratroopers were killed in action – one during the jump and one by a mine.
The paratroopers also sustained sixteen injuries from the jump. They managed to kill a
lone guerilla and captured an impressive eighty-four prisoners, including two
defectors.308 However, the most important result of the operation was that they
successfully resettled the civilians.309 In doing so, the paratroopers continued to make
progress towards the National Campaign Plan’s objective of a government controlled
South Vietnam by expanding the government presence into new areas.
Ambushes were the most effective operation for the Viet Cong when combating
ARVN. In 1963, they still rarely defeated ARVN regulars in a conventional fight. On
February 6, near Thoi Binh village in the Ca Mau peninsula, three companies of South
Vietnamese militia were searching for Viet Cong in a thick forest. During the patrol,
three hundred guerillas ambushed the militiamen pinning down the first two companies
while mauling the third. Before the insurgents withdrew, they killed thirty-four of the
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militiamen, wounded twenty-seven, and captured twenty-two firearms.310 Ambushes gave
the Viet Cong a serious tactical advantage against ARVN – it afforded them the element
of surprise. They could do significant damage to the enemy before they were even able to
respond. However, ambushes were not a guarantee of success and they could end
negatively for the attackers, especially when ARVN was able to make use of its superior
firepower.
An ambush that happened on the same day as the Thoi Binh ambush illustrates
this point. Marine landing craft were floating down a river when the Viet Cong detonated
two mines both of which sunk a South Vietnamese boat. A group of Marines in
speedboats attacked the Viet Cong ambush position, killing twenty-five guerillas while
only losing seven of their own.311 Although ambushes presented a great opportunity for
the Viet Cong to win victories against ARVN they came with risks. They also gave
ARVN units an opportunity to fight the Viet Cong. Ambushes tended to be more
successful against the poorly trained militia, but as the Marines demonstrated they were
far more difficult against ARVN’s elite units.
Another ambush near the village of Binh Chanh in March illustrates this point. A
rifle platoon of the 1st Marine battalion was patrolling strategic hamlets 30km north of
Saigon with a section of three M24 light tanks. The lead element ran into a mine setting
off a flurry of small arms fire from sixty to one hundred guerillas. The rest of the platoon
encircled the ambush site as the insurgents withdrew. The M24 tanks pursued the
insurgents but they managed to escape. The Viet Cong only managed to kill five Marines
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in the fight while leaving behind four bodies of their own. Positively for ARVN, the local
villagers sheltered and cared for their wounded, suggesting that they had popular support
in the area.312 While the Marines were unable to turn the ambush into a clear victory, they
did manage to blunt its effectiveness through a quick and aggressive reaction.
During an ambush in Tay Ninh province on 15 April, the Viet Cong scored what
may have been their most impressive victory of the year. They successfully ambushed a
company of paratroopers from the elite Airborne Brigade who were investigating a
suspected guerilla training camp. In the firefight the element of surprise proved decisive
as the Viet Cong inflicted serious casualties on the Airborne company before they were
able to effectively respond. The insurgents managed to kill at least eighteen paratroopers
and wounded twenty-seven more.313 Another estimate claims that the paratroopers lost
around sixty men dead and suffered 150 wounded. As a result, an Airborne battalion was
inoperable for months. Former ARVN officer Nguyen Cong Luan contends that the
ambush was a worse defeat for South Vietnam than Ap Bac because the supposedly
“invincible paratroopers” had been mauled.314 It further demonstrates how a singular
focus on Ap Bac fails to account for the complexities of the war in 1963. By focusing
solely on Ap Bac, one misses the ups and downs of the ARVN war effort. Only by
paying attention to these contours is it possible to come to a more complete
understanding of the state of the war in 1963.
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The war north of the Delta went well for ARVN in 1963. From 31 March to 17
April, the 3rd Strike Force Company of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, a
Montagnard militia program, conducted Operation Dan Thang 401 in Phu Bon Province
near the major city of Pleiku. They were supported by United States Special Forces
Detachment A – 412. Their objective was to destroy a Viet Cong base in the area and as
they approached it, they were continuously harassed by small arms fire. The operation
produced little contact with the enemy – only a few minor skirmishes. However, during
their journey, the Strike Force discovered refugees whose homes had been burned to the
ground by the guerillas. The refugees requested to be resettled under government control,
which they preferred.315 Although Operation Dan Thang 401 did little damage to the
guerillas, it did expand the government’s control over the population. Most importantly,
it suggests that at least some of the Vietnamese rural population preferred the
government’s rule to the Viet Cong.
Further highlighting ARVN success in the north, on 8 April they won an
important victory in the northern coastal area of Quang Ngai, where the strategic hamlet
program was considered quite successful. The Viet Cong launched a major attack on 10
strategic hamlets in the region with about four hundred men. In doing so, they made the
mistake of dividing up their attack groups into units too small to overrun the hamlets.
Only one group was of company size and it was driven back by two squads of the 25th
Infantry Division, leaving behind six bodies. The local population demonstrated support
for the government by revealing the insurgent company’s new location to the 25th
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Division who encircled the Viet Cong in a nearby swamp with M113s. The operation
ended in failure for the attackers who sustained 134 casualties to ARVN’s sixty-two
casualties. However, the most important victory for ARVN during this fight was the
assistance of the population, which demonstrates the success of the Strategic Hamlet
Program in winning over the population.316 ARVN’s objective under the National
Campaign Plan was to keep pressure on the Viet Cong and expand government control,
not to simply win battles. At Phu Bon and Quang Ngai, ARVN made progress towards
those goals. In both cases, the locals expressed support for government rule an important
marker of success.
In the north, the war was far less active. This inactivity was in part due to the
Central Highlands smaller population than in the Delta which limited the size of the
insurgents who depended heavily on the population for supplies and shelter. It was also
partly the result of a relatively higher concentration of ARVN units in I and II Corps to
repel potential North Vietnamese attacks. This situation gave ARVN the upper hand in
the northern provinces which limited the insurgents’ ability to attack. There the Viet
Cong did not experience near the success they had against the Strategic Hamlet Program
in the south.
In late April, the Viet Cong overran two strategic hamlets in the U Minh Forest of
the Ca Mau peninsula. On 18 April, they had attacked eight hamlets in the area, but
ARVN air support forced them to withdraw without success. The next morning, they
concentrated on two of the hamlets which were isolated from the rest and therefore more
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vulnerable. The guerillas stormed the hamlets with heavy weapons and overwhelming
numbers. They routed a company of Self-Defense Corps militia and a company of
regulars. The insurgents occupied the hamlets and the government decided not to retake
them.317 Though a serious loss for the government, they made the right decision in not
reoccupying the vulnerable hamlets. Concentrating their forces in the six remaining
mutually supporting hamlets gave them a better chance to defend them going forward.
For the next month, ARVN experienced a string of defeats in the central
highlands area of Kontum. On 27 April, the base of two battalions of the 22nd Division
was infiltrated by two Viet Cong battalions in which thirty-six ARVN soldiers were
killed along with an American Master Sergeant. ARVN also suffered twenty-three
wounded and lost thirty men missing in action. The guerillas also managed to destroy two
pieces of 105mm artillery while sustaining an unknown number of casualties.318 On 30
April, the Viet Cong attacked ARVN units that were pursuing the perpetrators of the 27
April attack. In the fighting, ARVN managed to kill ten guerillas and wound twenty more
while only losing seven of their own men and one wounded.319 Another ambush in the
same area took place on 16 May when the Viet Cong hit an ARVN convoy returning
from an operation killing twenty-one men and wounding twenty-four.320 This series of
ARVN defeats demonstrates that even in areas where the war was going well for ARVN,
they could experience setbacks.
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The strength of ARVN’s situation in Kontum is best demonstrated by looking at
the Sedang, a Montagnard tribe of 40,000 to 80,000 people who lived in the northern area
of the province.321 They became fiercely anticommunist after the Viet Cong kidnapped
some of their people during a raid on their villages in 1962.322 The Sedang even fended
off an insurgent attack armed only with crossbows.323 Their tightly organized villages
were easily incorporated into the Strategic Hamlet Program as they were able to be
fortified without resettlement, and two battalions worth of Sedang were trained as part of
the Self-Defense Corps. The tribe was well known for its courage, aggressiveness, and
martial skill, and the militiamen who defended villages often fought to the death.324
During the summer of 1963, the Sedang defeated the Viet Cong near the village of Dak
Bom. A Sedang woman spotted a dozen insurgents about one mile from the village and
notified the Self-Defense Corps. A group of ten militiamen tracked the Viet Cong and
charged when they got within one hundred yards. They killed five of the guerillas while
losing one man of their own.325 The Sedang demonstrated strong support for the
government in Kontum and an incredible ability to defend themselves from Viet Cong
attack without much American support. They illustrate the potential for success that
resulted from the Strategic Hamlet Program.
While the war in the North was making progress, there is also evidence to suggest
the war in the Delta was going better than is generally believed. ARVN won an
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impressive victory in the Plain of Reeds on 18 May. The Viet Cong attacked two
battalions of ARVN infantry supported by twelve armored personnel carriers. As the
guerillas crossed the waist high muddy water of the open paddy, the APCs launched a
brutal counterattack. They crushed insurgents under their tracks and raked the Viet Cong
with their machine guns. At one point, two brave guerillas attempted to rush the APCs
with grenades, but they were killed before they could finish their attack. In the fighting,
between forty and eighty Viet Cong were killed and twelve were captured. Only one
ARVN soldier was killed in the battle. The American advisors believed that the Viet
Cong had launched the doomed attack because the communist propaganda that came out
of Ap Bac made them overconfident.326 Whatever the reason, ARVN dealt a major blow
to the enemy.
On 22 May, ARVN won another major victory in the Delta province of Ba Xuyen
in Operation Duc Thang 17/42. The operation was conducted by Eagle Force which
consisted of one battalion of the 21st Infantry Division, two Ranger companies, and an
M113 company. They were attempting to flush out any Viet Cong in the area and engage
targets of opportunity. Their hunt turned up an estimated 410 guerillas. Eagle force
mauled the Viet Cong in the fighting, killing thirty-two of the enemy and capturing
another forty-two prisoners.327 They had managed to eliminate eighteen percent of the
enemy forces they found. In both Ba Xuyen and the Plain of Reeds, ARVN put pressure
on the Viet Cong by bringing them into battle and denied them an opportunity to destroy
the government’s strategic hamlets.
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The province in which the battle of Ap Bac took place is useful for examining the
extent of ARVN success in the Delta in 1963. Dinh Tuong Province, in the Mekong
Delta, is generally considered one of the areas where the Viet Cong experienced the most
success dismantling the government’s strategic hamlets. However, the Viet Cong
experienced little improvement in their situation in the immediate aftermath of Ap Bac.
In fact, the South Vietnamese government even expanded its control over the province at
the start of 1963.328 By summer, the Viet Cong decided to increase their effort to attack
the hamlets and began by overrunning a government post in the village of Tan Ly Dong.
However, South Vietnam immediately rebuilt the post restoring their control over the
population.329
In their hamlet attacks, the Viet Cong faced the same dilemma the Americans
faced later in the war. Attacking and taking an enemy controlled village only to
immediately abandon it is ineffective at winning over that population. The villagers
admitted that much themselves. They said to the Viet Cong cadres, “if you want to
liberate the hamlets, please try to finish the job. It’s no use having you come to attack at
night when the following morning we have to rebuild them again.”330 They also said,
“please mobilize the armed units to come and occupy the strategic hamlet for good. It’s a
waste of effort to destroy it and then withdraw.”331 These statements reveal that even if
the hamlet militia were overrun, as long as ARVN could prevent the Viet Cong from
permanently occupying the hamlet they could maintain government control over the
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population, even if they supported the insurgents, and continue to make progress toward
achieving victory. For the Viet Cong to make progress toward victory, they needed to do
more than overrun the hamlets. They needed to occupy them.
Following the Tan Ly Dong attack, the Viet Cong failed to take the villages of
Long Dinh, Tam Hiep, and Xuan Son.332 Often the guerillas attacked the hamlets at night
and the government rebuilt them in the morning. The government’s posts were
surrounded continuously, and soldiers rarely ventured out of the hamlets.333 Despite this
the government still controlled the population cutting the Viet Cong off from their main
source of recruits, supplies, and shelter. After successfully occupying the village of Cam
Son on 26 May, the guerillas decided to launch a new effort to destroy the hamlets.334
They called it the July 20 Campaign for the day on which it was scheduled to begin. In
order to accomplish their objectives, the Dinh Tuong Viet Cong’s main force units, the
514th and 261st Battalions, which had achieved victory at Ap Bac had to mass up and
attack the hamlets with enough force to occupy them.335 This presented an excellent
opportunity for ARVN to face them in battle.
The Viet Cong’s major success in the campaign came at Vinh Kim where the
514th and 261st Battalions overran the Self-Defense Corps post in the village. The
guerillas celebrated it as a glorious victory in which they imagined that “the country
would be reunified very soon.”336 The next day they abandoned the village and the
government reoccupied it. The Viet Cong’s inability to hold onto overrun hamlets
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allowed South Vietnam to exert control over the population and to continue to make
progress toward victory.
On 20 July, the 2nd Company of the 514th Battalion launched an operation to
disrupt strategic hamlets in Cho Gao district. In response, the 7th Infantry Division, under
the command of ARVN’s Chief of Staff General, Tran Thien Khiem, was sent out face
the Viet Cong in what was essentially a rematch of Ap Bac. The battle took place near the
village of Quon Long.337 Like at Ap Bac, the guerillas were well dug in. They manned
complex foxholes that included escape tunnels which suggests the extensiveness of their
fortifications. Furthermore, they had three BAR light machine guns covering the
approach to their position over open paddy. ARVN sent in infantry supported by armored
personnel carriers and air power. They attacked in two groups. One company of infantry
advanced alone through the paddy under immense enemy fire. In doings so, they lost
fourteen men killed in action, but they pressed on and captured the enemy defenses. The
second group, supported by APCs, had a much easier time overrunning the Viet Cong’s
defenses. After the battle, ARVN found fifty-eight enemy bodies and estimated that as
many as eighty more fatalities may have been pulled away by the guerillas. Only eighteen
ARVN soldiers were killed with forty-five more wounded.338
The battle of Quon Long was a major victory for ARVN. They successfully
defended the strategic hamlets and put an end to the Viet Cong offensive meant to
destroy them. However, most importantly, they demonstrated that Ap Bac cannot be
taken as representative of their combat performance. In almost the same conditions as Ap
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Bac, ARVN managed to succeed where they had failed on 3 January. They successfully
used infantry, armor, and air power to attack enemy defenses over an open rice paddy.
They fought aggressively and dealt a heavy blow to the Viet Cong. The battle of Quon
Long illustrates that war in 1963 was going far better for ARVN than simply examining
Ap Bac suggests.
The Viet Cong’s fortunes in Dinh Tuong did not fare any better in the months
leading up to the Coup. Though they stressed destroying hamlets, those operations made
up only ten percent of their engagements with ARVN.339 After the mauling at Quon
Long, the 514th Battalion was reluctant to fight ARVN the rest of the year and few gains
were made until the fall of Diem.340 Even in one of their most successful provinces, the
Viet Cong were unable to destroy the Strategic Hamlet Program. Outside of the Delta, the
Viet Cong were even less effective rarely attacking the strategic hamlets.341 The
government still controlled large portions of the population through the Strategic Hamlet
Program, and as their more successful provinces improved, they could afford to redeploy
forces to concentrate on more troublesome areas. In fact, they did just that on 22
September by moving the 9th Infantry Division into the Mekong Delta to assist the 7th and
21st Divisions in spreading government control.342 As the Diem regime neared its end,
South Vietnam was well positioned to continue making progress, with the Strategic
Hamlet Program and National Campaign Plan, towards their goal of a government
controlled South Vietnam.
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For the Republic of Vietnam, the summer of 1963 was dominated by a political
debacle known as the Buddhist crisis. It began on 8 May when nine Buddhists were killed
by Civil Guard militiamen in a protest in Hue against a newly passed law that banned the
flying of Buddhist flags on the Buddha’s birthday.343 This sparked further Buddhist
protests which President Diem harshly put down. To many this made the Catholic Diem
look like a tyrant who was religiously persecuting his own people. On 11 June, a
Buddhist monk protested the government’s Buddhist policies by burning himself alive.344
Diem’s sister in law, Madame Nhu, described the act as a “barbeque” which seriously
damaged the image of the Diem regime.345 On 18 August, the government's repression
peaked with a series of military raids on Buddhist Pagodas throughout Vietnam.346
Members of the orthodox school of Vietnam War historiography claim that the
government’s authoritarian response to the Buddhist crisis caused them to lose the hearts
and minds of the people to the Viet Cong as popular support for the Diem regime
plummeted. For instance, Neil Sheehan makes this argument by quoting a cable from
American Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge to President Kennedy.
“The Viet Cong are steadily gaining in strength; have more of the population on their side
than has the GVN (South Vietnam) … more and more students are going over to the Viet
Cong.”347 However, Lodge’s argument is difficult to substantiate due to a lack of
evidence. Absent something like polling data on the South Vietnamese population’s
support for the regime, we simply have to take Lodge and Sheehan at their word.
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However, their claims can easily be contradicted. The commander of the ARVN 3rd
Regiment in I Corps claimed to American General Victor Krulak that the common people
did not care about the Buddhist crisis.348 In light of these contradictory claims, is it
possible to come to a more concrete determination about whether the Buddhist crisis
caused the Diem regime to lose the support of the people to the Viet Cong?
Fortunately, there is a more useful measure of a population’s support for insurgent
movements than popular support or hearts and minds. It is called ‘tangible support’ and it
was first conceived by the RAND Corporation in a study of insurgencies called Paths to
Victory.349 It asserts that tangible support is the most accurate indicator of an
insurgency’s success or failure based on an analysis of seventy-one case studies of
insurgencies that have taken place since World War II. It defines tangible support as “the
ability of the insurgents to maintain the needed levels of recruits, weapons, and material,
funding, intelligence, and sanctuary.”350 Tangible support can come from outside
assistance or the population itself. Therefore, an increase or decrease in tangible support
to the insurgents can be used to evaluate whether or not their support among the
population is growing.
Unfortunately, gathering accurate data on the factors that make up tangible
support is difficult. Insurgencies, including the Viet Cong, prefer to keep that information
hidden and no American or South Vietnamese estimates of many of the factors exist. So,
lacking such data on the tangible support of Viet Cong is it possible to get even a rough
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measurement of their tangible support? Absolutely. Major increases in tangible support to
insurgent movements inevitably become apparent as an actual increase in the fighting
abilities of the insurgents in combat. It happened several times during the Indochina and
Vietnam Wars. In 1949, Communist China won their civil war and increased tangible
support to the Viet Minh, which became apparent in their destruction of the French bases
along Route Coloniale 4 in 1950.351 It was also apparent in 1964 after the North
Vietnamese first sent their army units south at the end of 1963, leading to a series of
major victories like the battles of Ba Gia and Binh Gia.352 This thesis also demonstrates
that the reverse was true the increase in weapons, material, funding, and intelligence that
resulted from President Kennedy’s decision to increase the advisory effort in South
Vietnam produced impressive battlefield results in 1962. So, did the Viet Cong’s combat
abilities improve after an increase in tangible support resulting from the Buddhist crisis?
At first glance, it might look like that was the case. The State Department’s
intelligence agency thought so claiming that after June, South Vietnam had experienced
“an unfavorable shift in the military balance.”353 Statistics on the number of Viet Cong
attacks per month in 1963 show that the State Department’s view was not entirely
accurate. After 407 attacks in June, the number of Viet Cong attacks did increase slightly
to 410 in July. However, the number of attacks fell to 368 in August.354 This decrease in
attacks and the 7th Division’s victory at Quon Long on 21 July suggests that there was no
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immediate increase in tangible support to the Viet Cong during the summer of the crisis.
But a sharp increase in the number of Viet Cong attacks to 503 in September supports the
possibility of an increase in tangible support. 355 Therefore, it is necessary to further
examine the fighting in September to determine if the Viet Cong’s combat power had
really increased.
In the second week of September, the Viet Cong launched a new offensive in the
Delta. It quickly devolved into a disaster as the guerillas were torn apart by ARVN
counterattacks. The offensive started on 9 September when two hundred men of the 261st
and 514th Battalions armed with heavy weapons attacked three Civil Guard outposts in
Co Gong.356 ARVN sent three companies of Civil Guards with armored support to
reinforce the outposts. On the way, they were ambushed by the guerillas, but in this case
the terrain favored the defenders. The Viet Cong had set up their ambush in an open area.
If they attempted to withdraw, they would be mauled by American air power. This forced
them to stay and fight, giving ARVN an excellent opportunity to up the pressure on the
Viet Cong. The ambushers managed to blow up an armored personnel carrier with a
recoilless rifle, but the rest of ARVN’s armored support quickly turned the tide of the
battle. A group of five armored cars charged the insurgents’ position while the militiamen
executed a flanking maneuver. The guerillas were crushed under the wheels of the
armored cars.357 When the fighting stopped, the American advisors counted eighty-three
Viet Cong bodies scattered across the battlefield. While losing only twenty-two men
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killed in action and twenty-eight wounded, ARVN had managed to eliminate nearly half
of their enemy. 358 Already the Viet Cong’s new September offensive was in trouble.
The next day, 10 September, the Viet Cong attacked two district capitals in the Ca
Mau peninsula: Cai Nuoc and Dam Doi. Both attacks got off to a successful start but
quickly fell apart during the ARVN counterattack. Shortly after midnight, the Viet Cong
overran Cai Nuoc following a brief mortar barrage. They held the city until well after
noon, during which time they assassinated the district chief. At 1830, the 5th Airborne
Battalion dropped on Cai Nuoc and reoccupied the town after a heavy firefight. 359 Cai
Nuoc was a modest success for the Viet Cong. They managed to hold the city for most of
the day and dealt a major blow to the district government. However, the battle at Cai
Nuoc was quickly overshadowed by the sharp fighting at Dam Doi.
At 0130, the 306th Viet Cong Main Force Battalion attacked Dam Doi with
around four hundred men.360 The town was defended by a single company of Civil
Guards who prevented the Viet Cong attackers from completely overrunning the town.361
In response, General Huynh Van Cao ordered the Vietnamese Marines to retake the city.
At 0830, the 4th Company 2nd Marine Battalion landed in a flooded rice paddy and began
the slow process of slogging through the waist-deep water of the paddy towards the
city.362 Their advance was halted by enemy machine gun fire. By nightfall they managed
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to find a suitable site to set up a 57mm recoilless rifle that knocked out the Viet Cong
machine gun which allowed them to attack and occupy the enemy position.
At 1000, 3rd Company landed next to a line of palm trees by the Dam Doi
River.363 Here the most important forgotten ARVN victory of 1963 began. The Marines’
landing zone placed them right next to the Viet Cong defensive positions on a series of
mounds near the banks of the river. This left the Marines dangerously exposed to enemy
machine gun fire, nearly unable to advance through the paddies, and totally unable to see
the guerillas through the foliage. They were in fact in an even worse position than the 7th
Division at Ap Bac, because here the Viet Cong also occupied the high ground making
any attempted assault all the more difficult.364 For the next few hours, the Marines were
pinned down by a barrage of enemy small arms fire.
At 1300, a reserve platoon under the command of Aspirant Nguyen Van Dien
reinforced 3rd Battalion on their right side. They were immediately suppressed by enemy
machine gun fire. Several hours later, running low on ammunition, Aspirant Dien ordered
a charge on the Viet Cong position. His platoon slogged through the leech-filled paddy
taking fire the entire time. During the charge, Aspirant Dien was wounded but the platoon
kept moving.365 The 3rd Battalion joined in, launching waves of assaults on the enemy
positions. By nightfall the Marines took the enemy positions forcing the Viet Cong to
withdraw.366 The Marines 1st and 2nd Battalions had easily reoccupied the city around
noon.367 In the fighting the Marines killed one hundred twenty-two guerillas and captured
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multiple machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifles. They only lost thirteen men killed
in action and twenty-nine wounded.368
The Marines rightly noted that “the Dam Doi Victory was ARVN’s biggest
victory for the entire year of 1963.”369 At Dam Doi, the Sea Tigers succeeded under even
worse conditions than had existed at Ap Bac. They had no air support, and they faced the
added challenge of attacking an even stronger enemy position.370 By pushing a series of
daring assaults against the Viet Cong’s fortification through to victory, the Marines
definitively proved that ARVN’s defeat at Ap Bac was not representative of ARVN’s
overall combat performance.
Furthermore, they successfully put an end to the Viet Cong September offensive.
The guerillas carried out no major attacks for the rest of the month and in October the
total number of Viet Cong attacks plummeted to 369.371 As demonstrated by the fighting
at Co Gong and Dam Doi, there was no noticeable increase in the fighting capabilities of
the Viet Cong. This suggests that at least in the months before the coup against Diem
there was no increase in tangible support to the Viet Cong as a result of the Buddhist
crisis. The people may have stopped supporting the Diem regime, but they did not start
supporting the Viet Cong. Those most upset at the government’s repression were
generally the most devout Buddhists who had no sympathy for the officially atheist Viet
Cong. The September offensive was an opportunistic attempt to cause the people to join a
general uprising to overthrow the government. That the people did not rise up to support
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the Viet Cong, further illustrates that there was no increase in tangible support to the
insurgents.
As the Diem regime neared its end, it was indeed struggling politically, but it was
still effectively making progress against the Viet Cong. The Strategic Hamlet Program
gave the government control over a large portion of the population, and the National
Campaign Plan gave ARVN an effective strategy for defending and expanding the
government’s control throughout the country. On the battlefield, at places like Tay Ninh,
War Zone D, Quon Long, and Dam Doi, ARVN’s forces still held the upper hand against
their Viet Cong enemies.
Surprisingly, the Viet Cong’s own accounts of the war in 1962 and 1963 admit
that ARVN was making progress – a rare occasion in their generally triumph accounts.
The North’s official history of the war states that “liberated areas and areas where the
masses had seized control shrank.”372 The official history of Military Region 5 near the
DMZ admits that they were unable to defeat ARVN in battle or stop them from putting
people in strategic hamlets. It says, “during 1963 enemy forces in Region 5 built 1,800
more hamlets, raising the number to 2,800 hamlets and causing us enormous
problems.”373 The situation was just as bad in Military Region 6 just to the south. In Ninh
Thuan and Binh Thuan provinces more than ninety percent of the population was secure
in the strategic hamlets. The Viet Cong admit “the balance of forces weighed heavily
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against us, and … the enemy was able to gather and take away a large number of civilians
from our bases and liberated areas.”374
The history of Military Region 7 describes the Politburo’s analysis of the
situation. “The enemy held military superiority over us. Even though our political forces
were strong, our armed forces were still weak.”375 “The reality was that the enemy had
been able to grab control of the population and the land from us, and he had drawn away
for his own use our sources of resources and manpower.”376 Clearly, ARVN was
successfully implementing the National Campaign Plan – keeping pressure on the Viet
Cong and allowing the government to expand the strategic hamlets. The history of
Military Region 9 in the Delta confesses that their attempts to destroy the hamlets were
unsuccessful. “After we destroyed a strategic hamlet, the enemy would rebuild it again. A
number of hamlets were destroyed and rebuilt again many times. We expended
tremendous efforts in the program to destroy strategic hamlets but in fact accomplished
very little.”377
On 31 October 1963, South Vietnam was well positioned to win the Vietnam
War. It had an effective strategy and a successful army that was more than capable of
defeating the enemy on the battlefield. Whether ARVN could have achieved victory if
they continued to pursue the NCP is impossible to know. However, on that last day of
October the future looked bright and ARVN had the upper hand in the fight against the
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Viet Cong. On 1 November, they threw away their best chance at victory in a coup d’état
that unleashed a long period of political turmoil in which all the gains that ARVN had
made over the course of 1962 and 1963 evaporated.
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION
From 1962 to 1963, ARVN was making progress toward victory in their war
against the Viet Cong. The first few years of the war had gone poorly for South Vietnam,
but President Kennedy’s decision in 1962 to increase military aid to Vietnam turned the
tide of the war into the South’s favor. American bombers, helicopters, and armored
personnel carriers gave ARVN forces the firepower and mobility they needed to defeat
the Viet Cong on the battlefield. As 1963 began, the struggling insurgents mauled
ARVN’s 7th Division at Ap Bac. Command and Intelligence failures by Americans and
Vietnamese combined with bad luck, poor terrain, and a determined enemy produced a
serious debacle. However, the failures were not representative of ARVN’s combat
performance during the rest of the year. In key battles at Tay Ninh, Quon Long, and Dam
Doi, ARVN proved that it was still the master of the battlefield in Vietnam.
As the Diem regime neared its end, the American military performed several
assessments of ARVN’s progress in the war against the Viet Cong and determined that
they were on the path to victory. The report of General Victor Krulak on 10 September
1963 observed that “the Viet Cong war will be won if the current U.S. military and
sociological programs are pursued, irrespective of grave defects in the regime.”378
Likewise the 2 October 1963 McNamara – Taylor report concluded that “the military
campaign has made great progress and continues to progress.”379 The American military
clearly believed that the Diem regime's authoritarian policies had done nothing to hamper

378
379

Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Document 82.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Document 167.

111

the progress of the war in Vietnam. In light of this military progress, one must wonder
why a coup even happened?
The answer is rather simple. While the Diem regime’s authoritarian response to
the Buddhist crisis did not cause them to lose the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese
people to the Viet Cong, it did cause them to lose the hearts and minds of the American
people, who in reality were their chief supporters. Polling conducted in response to the
Buddhist crisis showed that the support of the American public for President Kennedy’s
Vietnam policy and by extension for President Diem had fallen to only twenty-eight
percent in favor with fifty-six percent against.380 As Diem’s religious discrimination was
the obvious cause of this decline, supporting his removal seemed like the obvious way to
fix Kennedy’s falling numbers.
The American government’s dissatisfaction with the Diem regime presented a
great opportunity for some of South Vietnam’s generals to seize power for themselves.
The coup leaders claimed they removed Diem from power for the good of the country,
but their actions afterwards suggest otherwise.381 That they had no political plan that they
were ready to implement after the coup suggests that the coup was not started in response
to any dissatisfaction with the regime’s policies.382 However, they very quickly began
promoting their own into positions of power. For instance, General Ton That Dinh was
made Governor of Saigon and Minister of the Interior. General Nguyen Van Thieu was
promoted to brigadier general. Major General Mai Huu Xuan was made Chief of
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Police.383 The coup plotters were not crusaders against authoritarianism. They were
simply opportunistic power seekers. Furthermore, the forces used in the coup plot were
not motivated by dissatisfaction with the regime’s policies. They were paid with
3,000,000 South Vietnamese piasters that were given to the coup plotters by the CIA.384
For ARVN, the coup was a particularly tragic event. It proved to be the cause of
ARVN’s downfall instead of South Vietnam’s salvation as the political turmoil that
followed eroded ARVN’s fighting ability leaving it broken and defeated. The coup began
on 1 November 1963 and was led by Generals Duong Van Minh, Le Van Kim, Tran
Thien Khiem, Ton That Dinh, and Tran Van Don.385 Their forces consisted primarily of
the 5th Infantry Division, commanded by Col. Nguyen Van Thieu; the Marines; two
armored task forces; and a reserve platoon of tanks with some assistance from
reservists.386 They immediately acted to cut Diem off from any supporters who might be
able to come to his rescue. The divisions in IV Corps were the most loyal to Diem. So,
they were the first to be cut off. They sent Colonel Nguyen Huu Cu to arrest Colonel Bui
Dinh Dam and take over command of the 7th Division.387 They also moved the ferries
across the Mekong river to prevent the rest of IV Corp’s divisions from attempting to
save Diem.388
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The South Vietnamese Special Forces were another major ally of Diem that
needed to be eliminated. To accomplish this, the coup plotters sent some of the Special
Forces far away from Saigon on missions, and they captured the Special Forces
commander Colonel Le Quang Tung, put a pistol to his head, forced him to order the rest
of his troops to surrender, and then killed him.389 The commander of the Navy, who was
loyal to Diem, Captain Ho Tan Quyen was also murdered.390 The coup plotters gathered
all of the other generals who might be loyal to Diem in their headquarters under the
pretense of a JGS meeting. Then the coup plotters arrested them and confiscated their
weapons.391 Before the fighting had even begun the coup had basically succeeded. Diem
was cut off from any military support and his 2,500-man Presidential Guard were no
match for the coup’s forces.
The commander of one of the armored task forces, Major Ly Tong Ba, who had
served at Ap Bac, was deeply troubled by his mission. He had joined ARVN to fight the
Viet Cong not his fellow ARVN soldiers.392 In his memoirs he wrote, “my own hands
were soiled by the blood of my comrades-in-arms, and in my heart all I ever wanted was
solidarity, unity, and constructiveness.”393 As his armored personnel carrier drove down
the road to Saigon, he agonized about his orders to attack Gia Long Palace where Diem
was staying.394 He described the coup as the most difficult operation of his career.395 In
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this difficult circumstance, Ba and many other ARVN soldiers fought admirably,
conclusively demonstrating the superb qualities of the South Vietnamese soldier.
The 1st and 4th Marine Battalions occupied the National Police Headquarters and
Saigon Radio Station. The Presidential Guard sent M-41 light tanks and M113s to
reoccupy the radio station, but the Marine commander convinced them to surrender.396
On the night of 1 to 2 November the coup forces surrounded attacked Gia Long Palace.
They advanced slowly hoping to limit the bloodshed. Their task force’s armored
personnel carriers worked with the reserve tank platoon to suppress the defenders while
the Marines assaulted the palace. Around dawn, the Marines used a 57mm recoilless rifle
to blow a hole in the palace’s wall. The Marines stormed inside only to discover that
President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu had already escaped.397 They had
successfully overthrown the government. The consequences of their success eventually
came back to haunt them
Most of the coup plotters never intended to kill Diem in the coup. Major Ba,
General Dinh, and General Don all contend that they planned to guarantee the President’s
safety.398 However, General Minh had no such intention. At 0645, Diem and Nhu
surrendered to the coup plotters who sent several APC’s to pick them up from the
Catholic church in Cholon where they were hiding. They were assassinated in the back of
the APCs by Minh’s bodyguard, Nguyen Van Nhung, on the way to the coup plotters
headquarters.399 With them died ARVN’s best chance at victory.
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Instead of ending the political turmoil that had led to the downfall of the Diem
regime, the coup exacerbated it. Every general saw it as an opportunity to launch their
own coup and become the man in charge. Over the next two years, nine different
governments ruled in Saigon.400 Each successive government purged the officers in
ARVN who were not loyal to the new government. One soldier, Pham Van Dinh, served
under four different division commanders, three different regimental commanders, and
four different battalion commanders in a single year. Without any steady command
presence, the moral of Dinh and his comrades plummeted.401 Tham Huy Vu was training
to become an officer during the coup at the Thu Duc Reserve Officers School. He recalls
that over the next year, three of the School’s commanders were replaced.402 Nguyen
Cong Luan, then a staff officer in the 22nd Division, reported that as the Division
commander was waiting to be replaced he was “virtually powerless.”403 He also reveals
that the morale of the men reached the lowest level of the war so far.404 The effectiveness
of ARVN leadership collapsed after the fall of Diem.
Loyalty to the regime had always been a factor in leadership decisions during the
Diem administration, often outweighing merit.405 After the coup, loyalty to whoever was
in power became the primary factor in selections for promotions. Well-connected officers
could advance as many as three ranks relatively quickly. The officer corps became
politicized to an extent far greater than under the Diem regime. General Cao Van Vien,
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who was the commander of the Airborne Brigade during the Diem period and later
became the Chief of the Joint General Staff, reported how the politicization of the officer
corps weakened ARVN:
This promotion spree created quite a crisis in rank value and seriously
undermined military discipline and leadership . . . By comparison, Diem's much
criticized promotion criteria looked rather benign since the recipients were but a
selected few. Gradually, the military splintered into small "centers of power,"
each evolving around an original junta member, and picking up new loyalties as it
grew and expanded.406
The politicization of ARVN leadership degraded its ability to effectively fight the enemy.
The Viet Cong took advantage of the situation and reclaimed control over most of the
countryside.407 ARVN’s gains in the past two years vanished.
The chaos of post-coup South Vietnam left ARVN severely weakened. North
Vietnam wisely decided to take advantage of this situation and sent its own army units
south for the first time.408 From late 1964 to early 1964, the North Vietnamese Army and
Viet Cong defeated ARVN in the Battles of Binh Gia Ba Gia, Song Be, and Dong
Xoai.409 This string of defeats left ARVN unable to defend South Vietnam on its own. In
the aftermath, MACV commander General William Westmoreland first recommended to

406

Cao, Leadership, 62.
Wiest, Vietnam’s Forgotten Army. 37.
408
Ang Cheng Guan, “The Vietnam War, 1962-64: The Vietnamese Communist Perspective,”
Journal of Contemporary History 35, no. 4 (October 2000): 617; Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 336-339.
409
Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 336-339, 372-375, 396-402.
407

117

President Johnson that American forces should be used to face the communists in
combat.410
In 1962 and 1963, ARVN had made steady progress toward its ultimate objective
of a noncommunist controlled South Vietnam. Using American-supplied mobility and
firepower ARVN had expanded the government’s control over the countryside and
consistently defeated the Viet Cong. After examining ARVN’s entire combat record
during this period, defeats like Ap Bac look more like an aberration than the norm. Even
the North Vietnamese admitted that ARVN had the upper hand during this period of the
war. Through hard fighting and the sacrifices of many brave men, from 1962 to 1963
ARVN was making significant progress in their war against the Viet Cong. Many years
of hard fighting remained, but in the months before the coup against Diem South
Vietnam’s chances of winning were greater than at almost any other point in the war.
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